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ABSTRACT 
HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
PRIOR TO THE BROWN DECISION ON LEGISLATION FOR THE DISABLED 
 
 
Robert Michael Thomas, B.A., M.S. 
 
Marquette University, 2011 
 
 
 
Black children achieved equal protection rights to 
attend K-12 public schools following the Brown v. Board of 
Education Supreme Court holding in 1954. Scholars claimed 
Brown was a catalyst for admittance of disabled students as 
well. They believed tactics of the Black Civil Rights 
Movement influenced advocates of disabled students during 
the Civil Rights Era (1954-68). Scholars assumed race and 
minority status were key to obtaining due process 
legislation for the disabled in the 1970’s.  
 
An historical analysis of primary sources including 
court cases, Congressional testimony, biographical and 
personal statements of disabled individuals, and secondary 
sources of authors and journal writers revealed the 
Disability Rights Movement was influenced more by Supreme 
Court cases during 1948-50 than by the Brown decision. 
These cases emphasized individuality and the value of 
personal equal protection rights over race, group 
consciousness, and minority status.  
 
 
The study reveals how revisiting the relationship 
between the pre-Brown activity around equal protection and 
the passage of due process rights legislation for the 
disabled changes the way scholars must now view special 
education.
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Historical Interpretation of Educating the Disabled 
Most educational scholars who author textbooks have 
acknowledged an historical connection between the Black 
Civil Rights Movement (BCRM) and later enactment of 
legislation for educating K-12 disabled students in public 
schools in the United States (Hardman, Drew, and Egan, 
2008; Kirk, Gallagher, and Anastasiow, 2000; Gearheart, 
Weishahn, and Gearheart, 1996). In their writings, designed 
for an audience of educators being trained to teach 
disabled students at the K-12 level, they imply that a 
seamless transition occurred to educate minority students 
and disabled students in regular public schools following 
the Brown v Board of Education (1954) Supreme Court 
decision mandating integration of blacks into K-12 public 
schools. According to Turnbull III, (1986, p. 8) the door 
to public schooling of the disabled was opened because 
“Brown gave rise to the right-to-education cases…judicial 
resolution of educational issues on constitutional grounds 
becomes precedent for judicial resolution of related civil 
rights issues on similar constitutional grounds”. 
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Focus of the Problem 
One might assume from Turnbull III’s (1986) reasoning 
that education of disabled students logically followed 
Court ordered education of blacks and other minorities. 
This reasoning would imply that disabled students 
constituted a minority group similar to black students. Yet 
Congress did not recognize disabled students as a distinct 
minority group until 1973, nineteen years after the Brown 
decision. Therefore, one cannot assume a linkage of 
expectations of due process and equal protection based upon 
minority status during the black Civil Rights Era (1954-
68). 
Data confirmed that over three million disabled 
students were excluded from regular public schools during 
this time period (U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973). 
Where scholars have failed was to examine equal protection 
litigation prior to Brown and determine how those holdings 
influenced what later would be known as the Disability 
Rights Movement (DRM). This examination of litigation prior 
to Brown would better explain how advocates of the disabled 
acquired Congressional legislation mandating inclusion of 
disabled students in K-12 public schools. 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine this question: 
What was the relationship between litigation by the Black 
Civil Rights Movement (BCRM) prior to Brown to achieve 
equal protection for minorities to subsequent actions of 
DRM proponents to secure due process legislation for the 
disabled? 
This examination will unravel how scholars view the 
structural framework of special education and service 
delivery today that adds to our scholarly knowledge beyond 
simplistic interpretations of textbook authors. Structural 
framework involves the premise upon which special education 
is defined. Scholars have failed to make the connection 
that litigation prior to Brown influenced legislation that 
established the theoretical interpretation and the 
structural framework of how special education was created. 
Previous scholars like Hardman (2008), Gearheart et 
al., (1996); Kaplan, 1996; and Turnbull III (1986) have 
failed to explore the Black Civil Rights Movement (BCRM) 
and Disability Rights Movement (DRM) relationship prior to 
the Brown decision and its affects on special education 
legislation. Scholars instead have provided a narrative 
commentary on how major civil rights events in the South 
from 1954-68 affected those fighting for due process for 
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the disabled, or as Switzer (2003, p. 83) claimed, 
“disability community activists have been able to 
“piggyback” on several decades of protest from the civil 
rights movement”. They have asked the reader to assume the 
fight for equal protection for blacks was aligned with due 
process for the disabled. However, examining actions prior 
to Brown demonstrated the lack of a seamless transition 
between the two movements and the uselessness of this 
commentary. Scholars have asked the wrong question and 
chosen a non-critical time period (1954-68). 
It was natural for scholars to connect the Brown 
decision toward educating the disabled, because this case 
“laid the foundation for future right to education cases on 
behalf of students with disabilities” (Osbourne, Jr., 1996, 
p. 4). According to Osbourne Jr., (1996, p.5) “Students 
with disabilities became known as the other minority as 
special educators and parents demanded that they be 
accorded the same rights to an educational opportunity that 
had been gained by racial and ethnic minorities”. Turnbull 
III (1986, p. 8) reinforced the connection of Brown toward 
education of disabled students by stating, “It was the seed 
that gave birth to other civil rights battles and to 
grounds for successful challenges to governmental 
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discrimination against certain persons because of their 
unalterable personal characteristics”. Turnbull III (1986, 
p. 8) emphasized Brown’s importance to the DRM because it 
legitimized the legal arguments of civil rights activists 
“furnishing them with a powerful tool for persuading 
legislatures, particularly Congress, to enact 
antidiscrimination legislation”. He maintained there were 
“undeniable similarities between the Brown plaintiffs and 
children with disabilities” (p. 9). Therefore scholars 
could justify the leap of the right to education from 
minority students to disabled students. 
My position states that this leap from connecting 
rights of the minority to rights of the disabled ignored 
the more subtle reasoning that education for the disabled 
developed around equal protection and due process rights of 
the individual in litigation for the disabled in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s. The value of individuality and the denial of 
equal protection on a personal level were lost when 
scholars painted a broad brush by assuming legal arguments 
in Brown that protected the minority in a class action 
equated similarly to the disabled. 
This broad assessment might be the result of how our 
legal system is structured. In order to have courts address 
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plaintiffs’ charges of denial of equal protection rights, 
the Legal Defense Team representing blacks filed class 
action suits that would encompass the entire minority 
group. Class action suits provided access to the federal 
court system. Scholars emphasized this class action linkage 
when DRM advocates imitated the legal tactics of the BCRM 
in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. My claim is that these 
scholars, while concentrating upon group dynamics and 
minority status in this litigation, missed the personal and 
individualistic nature that was the real basis for decision 
making in litigation for the disabled. 
Scholars neglected to cite four prior cases (1938-50) 
that were cited by the Justices in the Brown case, that 
will be explained in chapter two, that recognized that 
denial of equal protection was a personal matter that 
affected the individual in his or her daily societal 
living, and was a living reality distinct from courtroom 
artificial legal arguments of class action. It was the 
reality of denial of due process and equal protection in 
society that were the basis of litigation by advocates of 
the disabled. Alexander and Alexander (2001, p. 440) 
maintained “the legal mandate of Brown v. Board of 
Education set a precedent for the extension of educational 
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access to all children, including those with disabilities”. 
However, it is my conviction that scholars recognize the 
connection to Brown in DRM litigation is to prior cases of 
individual loss of equal protection on which much of Brown 
was argued. Class action that represented an entire 
minority group was needed to gain access to the legal 
system, but collective group consciousness and recognition 
of minority status were not the legal constructs that made 
a difference for the disabled.       
Rather than examining the similarities and differences 
of the BCRM and the DRM during the U. S. Civil Rights 
period, (1954-68) scholars need to examine the more germane 
question I propose: whether the tactics employed to acquire 
equal protection for blacks prior to Brown correlate, 
parallel, or refute actions taken subsequently by DRM 
leaders to acquire due process legislation. This question 
is more important because it substantiates that while much 
key literature attempted to address whether disabled people 
were recognized as a distinct minority group worthy of 
societal accommodations, that argument is inconsequential. 
What is of paramount interest is that the relationship 
of the BCRM and the DRM prior to Brown focused on due 
process as personal to the petitioner along the lines of 
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individuality, not according solely to race, group, class 
minority status, or class-consciousness. The legal focus on 
individuality fueled litigation and legislation towards due 
process and helped change society’s impression of disabled 
people from one of paternalism to independence. More 
important, this new knowledge can help scholars view 
special education within the structural framework as it 
exists in schools today. 
Relationship Between Two Movements 
Scholars like (Switzer, 2003; Scotch, 2001; Fleisher & 
Zames, 2001; Francis & Silvers, 2000; Percy, 1989) have 
established over the years that the BCRM had a profound 
impact on individuals fighting for due process rights for 
disabled people in the similar manner and tactics they 
chose. Some examples included the disabled college students 
at Berkeley, led by Ed Roberts, who challenged their 
restrictive housing situation in 1962. Mobility challenged 
workers, directed by Judy Heumann, protested the lack of 
transportation options with a sit-in in Richard Nixon’s 
election campaign office in New York City in 1972. In 
Denver, Colorado disabled workers created a media blitz 
about buses without adequate wheel chair lifts. 
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While this impact may be similar and has been handed 
forward by textbook authors to those who would teach K-12 
special education, what needs to be fleshed out on a 
scholarly level is the relationship of litigation which led 
to Brown to activities which impelled Congress to enact 
legislation of due process for disabled K-12 students in 
1973 and 1975. Scholars may be surprised to learn, for 
example, that advocacy for legislation for blacks was based 
on civil rights while advocacy for due process for the 
disabled initially followed economic concerns. 
What scholars have to gain is recognition that 
legislation establishing their due process rights for the 
disabled would be based upon accepting their individuality 
and distinct disability, not their class-consciousness of a 
larger minority group like blacks. Individuality implied 
that society accepted a disability as endemic to the person 
and accommodate and change its perspective of the disabled 
from one of dependence to independence, recognizing the 
disabled person’s right to control their own life. This may 
enable scholars to understand how expectations of disabled 
people evolved from dependence to independence and why 
treatment models evolved from medical/ institutional in the 
1940’s to educational/inclusive by the 1970’s. This 
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evolution in treatment models helps to explain the 
increasing advocacy that special needs children be educated 
in an inclusive setting. 
While some special education scholars (Scotch, 2001; 
Fleisher & Zames, 2001; Percy, 1989; Abeson, Bolick, and 
Hass, 1975) have noted and/or questioned the twenty-year 
time lag between education of minorities and the disabled, 
this is an unnecessary question. It adds nothing to the 
scholarly pursuit of how the development of special 
education legislation, impacted by litigation prior to 
Brown, predicated how special education is administered 
today in K-12 public schools. 
A more important question is how litigation by the 
BCRM prior to Brown laid the groundwork for judicial 
acceptance of the individuality of the individual, and thus 
rendered the petitioner worthy of equal protection rather 
than valued because of race. This acceptance placed equal 
protection on a personal rather than a class-conscious 
basis. This would be a cornerstone of legal argument for 
advocates of the disabled in litigation from 1967-73. 
An historical evolution of social acceptance of the 
disabled in chapter two will focus on primary sources of 
Supreme Court and state court cases and the participants, 
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testimony at House and Senate Congressional committees 
exploring due process legislation for the disabled, and 
testimony from legislative aides who helped design what 
became current legislation. Testimonials from disabled 
individual leaders will document their drive to acquire 
independence and greater control of their lives. Secondary 
sources of authors, journal scholars, advocates of the 
disabled, and written histories of disabled authors 
themselves will be used to examine evolving societal 
perspectives and expectations of disabilities. 
Critical for identifying relationships between the two 
movements are the needs to examine the similarities and 
differences in organization, leadership, membership, and 
tactics by examining previously cited court holdings, 
Congressional testimony, analysis by participants who 
participated in creating legislation, and analysis from 
secondary source authors. Thus this paper will highlight 
how legislation for the disabled developed when these four 
characteristics were juxtaposed with the litigation 
displayed by the Black Civil Rights Movement (BCRM) prior 
to the Brown decision. 
Chapter three will analyze, critique, and reinterpret 
the relationship of the two movements by utilizing the 
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methodology of historical research. Berg (2007, p. 234) 
defined historical research as “a process that examines 
events or combinations of events in order to uncover 
accounts of what happened in the past”. As Anderson (1990, 
p. 113) suggested, “Unlike other forms of educational 
research, the historical researcher does not create data. 
Rather, the historian attempts to discover data that exists 
already in some form”. Of course, scholars may differ with 
my historical interpretation. As Borg and Gall (1989, p. 
806) reminded, “Historians add another layer of 
interpretation in the way they choose to emphasize or 
ignore facts about the past and in the way they fit facts 
into categories and patterns”. 
My analysis will suggest an alternative relationship 
between the BCRM and the DRM from what previous scholars 
have represented based on data prior to the Brown decision. 
It will explore equal protection court cases of blacks that 
culminated with the Brown decision. It will make the 
connection between these cases and subsequent litigation 
from advocates of the disabled. This connection will allow 
scholars to reinterpret the relationship between the BCRM 
and the DRM that helps them better understand current K-12 
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special education theoretical thinking and its structural 
framework.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE DISABLED 
 
Introduction 
 
 The goal of this chapter is to present an historical 
timeline of education for the disabled in the United States 
and to highlight society’s changing acceptance and 
expectations of disabled people from 1800-1970. This will 
be juxtaposed with education for blacks from 1865-1954 to 
show that while scholars have never questioned minority 
status for blacks, scholars have debated and questioned 
with differing viewpoints whether minority status applied 
to disabled people. This was a contentious issue from 1948-
73 that constituted a copious amount of scholarly 
literature. It was, however, a pointless argument 
disconnected from the central issue. This issue was the 
relationship between the BCRM and the DRM prior to the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision. I make the contention 
that scholars and textbook authors examining the 
relationship between the BCRM and the DRM during the Civil 
Rights Era have examined the wrong data in the wrong time 
frame. 
It is immaterial whether a group may be recognized 
with minority status and thus entitled to societal 
accommodations to achieve inclusion. Minority status was 
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never the basis upon which legislation for due process for 
the disabled was premised. The real premise was 
individuality of the person and the distinct disability 
that determined due process rights. The important time 
period was 1948-50 when the BCRM litigated several Supreme 
Court cases seeking equal protection, not the Brown case 
and succeeding Civil Rights Era (1954-68). Brown was the 
culminating event, not the climactic event that led to due 
process in the 1970’s for the disabled. What was of 
importance with prior Brown cases was their legal emphasis 
on individual rights of the petitioner and that denial of 
equal protection harmed the petitioner in a personal sense. 
The importance of the relationship I pose is that 
litigation prior to Brown seeking equal protection for 
blacks affected the DRM’s success at achieving due process 
legislation, because prior litigation emphasized the 
individuality and personal disability of the petitioner 
over race, group, class-consciousness, or minority status. 
Evidence of the lack of importance in establishing minority 
status may be attributed to Congress’ tardiness of 
recognition of minority status to the disabled until 1973, 
long after the Civil Rights era ended. When examining how 
disabled people acquired federal due process legislation, 
the political and lobbying support that it entailed, and 
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individual efforts by the disabled themselves, scholars 
instead should focus their attention on the role of 
individuality and how that influenced a societal change of 
expectation from paternalism to independence, instead of 
alluding to race and minority status. 
This chapter will highlight litigation from the BCRM 
prior to Brown and subsequent DRM litigation in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s to demonstrate the linkage of individuality 
between the two movements and why this was important in 
achieving due process legislation for the disabled in 1973 
and 1975. Creation of special education following passage 
of this legislation was based on individuality, personal 
disability, and personal needs toward independence.  
Compulsory Education Versus Exclusion 
 In order to understand why due process legislation was 
proposed in Congress, one must undertake an historical 
review of education of the disabled. Initial review 
revealed that educators and lawmakers who promoted 
compulsory education meant it for “normal” students and not 
those with physical or mental defects. According to 
Osbourne Jr., (1996) education of disabled K-12 students in 
the United States from 1800 to 1975 was one of either 
exclusion or segregation. Rothstein (2000, p. 12) noted 
that, “While the Supreme Court has held consistently that 
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there is no federally protected right to education, 
nonetheless, if the state undertakes to provide education…a 
property interest is thereby created by the state”. In a 
pivotal Supreme Court case that defined the pursuit of 
happiness being linked to the ability to own property, the 
Court ruled that one’s ability to own property was 
inherently linked to one’s level of education (Wood v. 
Stricklnd (1975)). The Constitution under the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law or equal protection of 
the law. Legal scholar Ashley Thomas King (Byrnes, 2002, p. 
118) maintained that between 1852 and 1918 state 
legislatures “promulgated a right to an education through 
passage of compulsory education legislation applicable, 
theoretically, to all school-age children within their 
jurisdiction”. 
However, Osbourne Jr. (1996, p. 4) maintained that 
minorities and the disabled were usually excluded because 
in the “dilemma between exclusionary practices and 
compulsory education statutes” state appeals courts granted 
“the authority of school officials to exclude certain 
students”. Reasoning to exclude disabled children during 
the late 1800’s was to relieve stress on the teacher and 
other students (Beattie v. Board of Education of the City 
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of Antigo, 1919; Rothman, 2000, p. 11). More progressive 
reasoning in later years was to “avoid stress on the child” 
and to provide first “diluted academic training” followed 
up with “training for manual jobs” (Rothman, 2000, p. 11). 
 To understand the relationship between the BCRM and 
advocates of the DRM prior to the historic Brown decision, 
one must compare the educational history of America’s black 
and disabled students. Several scholars have claimed 
(Rothman, 2003; Scotch, 2001; Bryan, 1998; Gilson and 
Deploy, 2000; Osborne) that individuals with disabilities 
and their advocates could not help but be influenced by 
actions, events, and events generated by the BCRM since 
both groups had been routinely denied inclusion at regular 
public schools. These influences such as marches, boycotts, 
sit-ins and demonstrations have been well documented by 
previous scholars following the Brown decision, but the 
relationship has not been investigated in the run-up of 
events prior to the Brown decision. 
These scholars have erred in choosing to focus how the 
judicial holding in Brown centered on race when the true 
focus centered on individuality and personal equal 
protection exhibited in holdings of prior cases. This error 
in emphasis has led scholars like Hardeman et al., (2008) 
Osbourne Jr., (1996) and Turnbull III (1986) to assume race 
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and minority status were a linkage to the DRM in a seamless 
transition. When in fact a time gap occurred. 
While Brown may have been a catalyst for advocates 
seeking due process rights for the disabled, it did not 
generate dramatic improvement in K-12 enrollment of 
disabled students in regular public schools. Rothstein 
(2000, p. 16) documented that as late as 1975 one million 
disabled students were excluded from the public school 
system and over three million were attending schools in 
inappropriate settings for them to learn. As Cremins (1983, 
p. 15) noted, “ The period between 1954 and 1970 was for 
the most part a latent one in the area of landmark cases 
that would impact on the education of the handicapped”. 
Scotch (2001) added that during this time period it was the 
courts that supported due process rights and not 
legislation. This was borne out in cases that will be 
discussed: Wyatt, Wolf, Diana, PARC, and Mills.  
History of Special Education in the United States 1800-1970 
Education of the disabled in the United States 
developed slowly over time and was one of recognizing that 
educating meant teaching toward independence, not 
categorizing a disabled person into a group. The history of 
educational rights for disabled people has been 
characterized by Gearheart, el al. (1996) as one of four 
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phases: 1) Early history: Before 1800, 2) Era of 
institutions: 1800-1900, 3) Era of public school special 
classes: 1900-1960/70, and 4) Era of growth and 
reevaluation: 1960 to the present. Moreover, scholars have 
identified three distinct expectations of disabled people 
within these four phases of education: 1) vocational 
training, 2) paternalism, and 3) independence (Bryan, 2002; 
1996; Scotch, 2001; Covey, 1998; Charlton, 1998). 
Previous to modern times, local governmental 
authorities did not feel compelled to grant any civil or 
educational rights to disabled people prior to 1800 because 
contemporary thinking considered a disability to be the 
work of demons or evil spirits (Covey, 1998). Actions taken 
against a disabled child such as abandoning him or her or 
leaving the child by the side of a road were not considered 
barbaric, because the disabled were considered inhuman 
(Bryan, 2002). This attitude began to change gradually 
within Christian nations and Christianity’s theology of 
compassion. By Colonial days, disabled persons were thought 
more to be fools, idiots, or buffoons rather than the work 
of the devil. They were to be protected and kept safe from 
social abuse.  
By 1800 European nations attempted to provide a small 
degree of education for the disabled in institutions in 
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England, France, Germany, and Scotland. Researchers of the 
blind, deaf, and mentally defective learned that disabled 
individuals learned similar to normal people, but at a 
differing rate (Bryan, 1998; Covey, 1996). Thus they could 
profit from educational schooling. However, these 
institutions were provided mainly for individuals with 
visual or auditory impairments rather than for people with 
mental retardation or emotional disabilities. 
The first institution for the mentally retarded was 
begun in France in 1831. There research about mental age 
first developed and culminated in 1904 with the development 
of the intelligence quotient (IQ) by Simon Binet. Binet 
attempted to establish a linkage between mental age and 
chronological age. In France by the mid 1800’s, several 
institutions in or near Paris were operating with 
educational programs for the disabled. 
In the United States there was little federal 
involvement to educate the disabled in the 1800’s. 
According to Turnbull III, (1986, p. 13) 
“The earliest federal role – creating special schools  
for the mentally ill, blind, and deaf between the  
1820’s and the 1870’s – paralleled a similar movement  
at the state level, in which state schools for the  
handicapped were established as early as 1823”.  
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However, Kirk et al. (1996, p. 43) stated, “Before 1850 
there were few public provisions for children or adults 
with special needs. They were “stored away” in poorhouses 
and other charitable centers or left at home with no 
educational opportunities”. According to Kirk et al., 1996) 
it was not until 1896 that the first special class for 
mentally retarded schools was established in Providence, 
Rhode Island, followed by a class for children with 
physical impairments in 1899, and a class for the blind in 
Chicago in 1900. Further federal activity did not occur 
until the government created vocational rehabilitation 
programs for disabled veterans following World Wars I and 
II (Zames & Fleischer, 2001; Scotch, 1989; Turnbull III 
1986; Broudy, 1983). 
Three Societal Historical Expectations of the Disabled  
In regard to society’s expectation of the disabled in 
the United States, the first expectation elaborated by 
Percy (1989, p. 44-47) was one of economics and vocational 
training where federal and state governments created 
training programs to teach manual labor skills that would 
increase economic conditions for the disabled. Disabled 
people acquired job skills that were rudimentary and often 
government funded such as the Smith-Fess Act of 1920 that 
provided vocational training, job placement, and 
	  	  
23	  
counseling, and is administered to the present by the 
Federal Board for Vocational Rehabilitation. Self-help 
disability agencies like Goodwill and Disabled American 
Veterans also encouraged job skills and vocational 
training. 
Following World War II when the nation was faced with 
thousands of returning soldiers with physical and mental 
incapacities, the federal government accepted 
responsibility for restoring these returning veterans to 
mainstream life. This responsibility was economic in nature 
rather than an acceptance of civil rights for the disabled. 
In fact, Zames and Fleischer (2001, p. 7) reported: 
“Although disabled veterans were given priority in 
employment, civilians with similar disabilities were 
considered unemployable … so they should seek jobs in 
private industry.” Vocational programs were created to 
bestow benefits, monetary payments, and sheltered work 
training programs to disabled individuals that would 
increase their integration into mainstream society rather 
than recognize their disability as an accepted right 
(Scotch, 2001; Bryan, 1996; Percy, 1989). . These 
organizations formed connections with mainstream business 
outlets to sell their goods to the general public (Bryan, 
1996). 
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During the 1950’s a second expectation of disabilities 
developed that Covey (1998) and Bryan (1996) defined as a 
paternalistic view where either governmental or lobbyist 
national organizations who advocated for the disabled 
provided funding through either charitable contributions or 
governmental transfer payments. Examples provided by Scotch 
(2001) included Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), the 
National Association of the DEAF (NAD), the American 
Council of the Blind (ACB), the National Association of 
Retarded Citizens (NARC), the United Cerebral Palsy 
Associations and the federal government’s Social Security 
Disability Insurance program (SSI). While these 
organizations had political involvement, it has been argued 
by Scotch (2001 p. 34) “none was oriented toward the 
general issue of civil rights for all disabled people”. 
Disabled people themselves were not members of these 
organizations. 
After the war, several special interest organizations 
and agencies like the Heart Association, the Cancer 
Society, Easter Seals with its March of Dimes, United 
Cerebral Palsy, and the Muscular Dystrophy Association 
provided funding and positive publicity toward educating 
the disabled (Rothman, 2003). However, organizations like 
Muscular Dystrophy and United Cerebral Palsy Association 
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concentrated funding and assistance more on the cause of 
the disability, rather than on its effects on those 
currently disabled. Much of their funding centered on 
searching for a cure or prevention of the disability rather 
than providing for accommodations (Zames & Fleischer, 
2001). 
Institutionalization rather than accommodation within 
mainstream society remained the method of treatment. 
According to Rothman (2003, p. 27) “By the late 1950’s, 
large, total care institutions provided most of the care 
for disabled people. Some of these institutions specialized 
in training people with specific kinds of disabilities for 
employment”. 
Given the institutional nature of care prevalent in 
the 1950’s, treatment did not differentiate between 
disability types. Hardeman et al. (2008) reported that 
state run institutions housed disabled individuals into 
separate gender care sections where they were taught to 
perform menial tasks. This training did not address 
specific mental, emotional, or learning disabilities, but 
appeared to be designed more for the efficient running of 
the institution rather than to increase the independence of 
the individual. Family members were limited in the amount 
of contact with their disabled family members. According to 
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Smart (2001, p. 34-36) and Clarizio, (1983) institutions 
administered a standardized medical model treatment 
approach, which will be explained later in this chapter, 
with over-reliance on physical doctors and pharmaceuticals 
over educators and independent living trainers. 
However, Hardeman et al. (2008) and Clarizio (1983) 
reported that by the late 1950’s, a competing philosophical 
model of treatment called “psychoeducational” placed more 
emphasis on teaching to the specific disability, ignoring 
the need to establish causation, and increasing a person’s 
practical living skills as a more effective treatment 
approach. A large number of disabled veterans, and parents 
of children with intellectual impairments advocated that 
disabled people desired public entitlements like access to 
housing, transportation, and employment rather than 
institutionalization in their living arrangements (Rothman, 
2003; Bryan, 1996). 
A third expectation of disabilities evolved by the 
early 1960’s when disabled individuals, becoming more 
politically active in their well-being, attempted to 
resolve their personal local difficulties of housing, 
transportation, and employment. Since many disabled people 
no longer were seen as needing institutional care, more of 
them began being released and living either with family or 
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in independent living situations. This meant they needed 
practical living skills to survive in normal society. 
Recognizing their need for increased independence in order 
to be included, they appealed to local governmental bodies 
like city councils and housing authorities that to be 
independent required societal accommodations that might 
improve their chances for acquiring better practical living 
skills and more inclusion.  
 During the 1950’s lobbying groups like the American 
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) wielded more 
political power than previously, and alternative treatment 
approaches began to emerge. These lobbying groups clamored 
for deinstitutionalization of the disabled and 
reinstatement of due process rights, and more family 
involvement (Hardman et. al., 2008; Turnbull III, 1986). 
Several (Switzer, 2003; Scotch, 2001; Francis & Silvers, 
2000; Charlton, 1998) have argued that this process was 
slow to evolve because media attention was not focused on 
disabled individuals in any national public awareness in 
the 1950’s. Clarizio (1983) noted how treatment models 
slowly changed from psychodynamic (medical/institutional) 
from the 1920’to psychoeducational in the late 1950’s 
(educational/societal). This meant that disabled 
individuals obtained value within society as individuals 
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rather than categorization as a member of a group. Emphasis 
changed from requiring protection from society to learning 
to cope within it. Advocates advanced that disabled people 
had a productive role to play within the community and need 
not be sheltered from it. 
Education of Disabled Students in the 1960’s 
With disabled people desiring more productive roles 
within society, the shifting paradigm from medical to 
educational was important for school age children because 
this meant their learning needs could be met, for the most 
part, in regular school settings with their peers, not in 
segregated state hospitals. Consequently, according to 
Hardeman et al. (2008) and Gearheart et al., (1996) a mass 
release of disabled people from state institutions occurred 
in the early 1960’s. For students this meant inclusion and 
accommodation in state funded residential public school 
settings for classes designed for deaf, blind, and the 
significantly intellectually impaired. This meant they 
would be receiving education with their own peers in a more 
normal environment. 
Gearheart et al. (1996) noted that with the adoption 
of compulsory attendance laws for students beginning in the 
early twentieth century, public schools faced the problem 
of “providing for students with mild retardation. Thus 
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public schools concentrated on “special” classes for 
students with mild mental retardation” (p. 8). This 
entailed that mildly disabled students, who concomitantly 
had behavior problems, were placed in the classroom with 
students having intellectual impairments, “and those who 
could not get along in this obviously special setting were 
expelled from school” (p. 8). 
Thus the 1960’s to early 1970’s gave rise to the era 
of the special class, a self-contained group of disabled 
students segregated from regular peers for varying lengths 
of the day. Gearheart et al. (1996, p. 9) described these 
classes where “general educators happily sent problem 
students to special classes, and special educators accepted 
a number of students who should not have been 
placed…Special classes were sometimes used as dumping 
grounds, vehicles of segregation…”  
According to Byrnes, (2002) Osbourne Jr., (1996) and 
Turnbull III (1986) parents of disabled students became 
dissatisfied with special classes and the inadequate life 
skills their children were acquiring. They sought 
litigation as their opportunity to gain inclusion into 
regular public school classrooms and looked to tactics 
previously enacted by the BCRM of marches, demonstrations, 
and sit-ins as their model. Many scholars (Kluger, 2004; 
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Gray, 2002; Payne, 1995; Carson, 1981) highlighted how this 
movement of litigation for equal protection for minorities 
begun in the 1940’s, reached notoriety to the general 
public following the Brown decision in 1954. However, while 
many scholars (Scotch, 2001; Zames & Fleischer, 2001; 
Bryan, 1996; Percy, 1989; Scotch, 1989) have linked this 
decision to subsequent actions in the 1960’s by the DRM 
movement, I submit prior Supreme Court cases of 1948-50 
have more significance because they stressed individuality 
and the value of the person over race and minority rights. 
This will be elaborated later in the chapter with four 
equal protection cases from 1948-50 that emphasized 
individual rights besides race. 
Black Education 1865-1954 
According to Williams (2004) and Anderson, (1988) 
blacks in the United States prior to the Brown decision in 
1954 were aware of their minority status and exclusion 
because they had been supporting two separate school 
systems with their taxes, one white and one black. Their 
perception of exclusion changed with a stroke of the pen on 
May 17, 1954 when many scholars of civil rights (Branch, 
1998; Williams, 1986; Eyes on the Prize, 1986) claimed that 
the American Civil Rights Movement in the twentieth century 
began. On that day the United States Supreme Court struck 
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down segregation of public school students because of race. 
Refusing to address the issue whether black and white 
schools under scrutiny were inherently equal, the court 
maintained segregation based solely on race deprived blacks 
of their education “even though the physical facilities and 
other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal” (Brown v. Board of 
Education, 1954, p. 4). Irons (2002, p. 162) argued, “What 
the cases really involved was the psychological impact of 
enforced separation on black children”. According to Irons 
(2002) and Gray, (2002) The unanimous 9-0 decision 
outlawing racial segregation in public schools and the 
Court’s order for local school boards in Southern states to 
integrate schools, challenged Jim Crow laws in the South, 
enforced equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and transformed the Southern way of life. 
Several have argued that previous to Brown, blacks 
especially in the South, had understood they were 
responsible for creating educational opportunity for their 
race; opportunity that had been denied since 
Reconstruction, because Jim Crow laws in the South mandated 
racial separation in schools (Irons, 2002; Haskins, 1998; 
Anderson, 1988). Because blacks took the initiative to 
create their own public school systems in the South, in 
addition to the taxation they provided for state funded Jim 
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Crow schools, their racial membership united them long 
before the Brown decision in 1954. They understood their 
local exclusion from the white community because according 
to Anderson, (1988) many of their K-12 schools were built 
with the economic funding of Northern philanthropists. 
Having lived in a segregated racial society where they 
were restricted to where they lived, played, worshipped, 
conducted business, and congregated, they realized 
themselves as a distinct minority that needed to be unified 
to survive (Irons, 2002; Chafe, 2001; Vann Woodward, 1966). 
Chafe (2001) reported how careful and circumspect a black 
man must be when walking down a southern sidewalk. A Jim 
Crow etiquette existed that required a black man to possess 
two personalities; displaying an artificial deferential 
behavior toward all white men, but asserting individual 
dignity among people of his own race. 
Because blacks were forced to pay the majority funding 
for their common schools between 1915-1935 with the help of 
Northern religious groups and Northern philanthropists like 
Julius Rosenwald, William H. Baldwin, and the Carnegie 
Foundation, (Anderson, 1988) they sought unity as a group 
for protection against the white power structure. This 
became more transparent in the 1950’s as according to 
Charles Payne, (2003) in quoting Michael Honey’s term: a 
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“transitional generation” developed after World War II of 
black agitators and resisters who challenged Jim Crow “on 
shop floors and in civic associations, in polling places 
and city buses pointing the ways to the mode of 
confrontation and direct action that would characterize the 
decades to come” (p. 401). 
These instigators were often returning veterans who 
were rural oriented, poor, with little education, and who 
had seen an alternative way of living while fighting 
fascism. Payne (1995) indicated that they were unwilling to 
tolerate lynching or to return to the Jim Crow South of 
their past. They became the grassroots membership that 
ignited the march toward justice when led by talented 
leaders like the “Legal Defense Team” (Tushnet, 1987) 
organized by the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP) and black ministers trained in 
passive resistance at reputable divinity schools. Watson 
2010, p. 48) reported how one Mississippi farmer once 
described the power of the grassroots movement in Freedom 
Summer, (Watson, 2010 p. 48) “It was the so-called dumb 
people,… {who accomplished it} The school teachers, the 
educated people, they ain’t did a damn thang!”. In other 
words, educated blacks within local communities had failed 
to galvanize a resistance to Jim Crow among less educated 
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blacks. However, outsiders represented by the Legal Team of 
the NAACP, were able to inspire these people toward action. 
According to Branch, (1998) collective membership of 
blacks had never been a contentious issue since they had 
experienced exclusion during slavery and post-
Reconstruction. During the Civil Rights Era, blacks sought 
equal protection and inclusion in mainstream society but 
were denied by a legalized Jim Crow power structure. Kluger 
(2004) documented that despite sympathetic whites that 
joined in the resistance tactics, blacks were a distinct 
minority group recognized by themselves and others, 
especially the federal courts when their civil rights were 
violated.  
Black Minority Status and Did It Matter? 
 Scholars like Barker, (1948) Fine and Asch, (1988) 
Zola, (1989) Bryan, (1998) Nagler, 1993; Gilson and Depoy, 
(2000) Mansbridge and Morris, (2001) Scotch, (2001) and 
Switzer (2003) have debated since 1948 whether the disabled 
population constituted a recognized minority group, whereas 
they have accepted blacks’ minority status. Minority status 
has been argued important because several scholars have 
agreed that minorities deserve societal accommodations that 
reverse discrimination in such areas as housing, 
employment, job opportunities, education and training, and 
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eligibility for social programs. Therefore, intellectual 
thinking could make the claim that if a group could 
establish its identity as a minority, society would be 
required to provide opportunities for greater inclusion. 
However, I propose determination of minority status is 
irrelevant in examining the relationship between the BCRM 
and the DRM. The forty years of back and forth debate has 
been divisive and irrelevant. It was pointless because 
legislation for due process rights for the disabled never 
centered on minority status. Importance always lay in the 
value of individual, personal rights which advocates of the 
DRM were able to convince legislators had been based on 
equal protection cases raised by the BCRM prior to Brown. 
This point will be expounded upon later in this chapter. It 
is only relevant to delineate the argument of minority 
status in a review of key literature to understand that 
minority status has always lurked in the background as a 
bogeyman when the issue of due process and equal protection 
were argued. A brief review of scholarly treatment of this 
topic regarding blacks and the disabled is appropriate. 
A review of key literature revealed that blacks were a 
recognized minority group with a collective consciousness. 
Historically, the (NAACP), founded in 1909, had been the 
most noted organization in support of colored peoples’ 
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rights (Berg, 2005; Tushnet, 1987). As Berg, (2005) Branch, 
(1998) and Williams (1986) showed, blacks needed 
organizational support especially in the South where Jim 
Crow Laws banned them from hotels, restaurants, gas 
stations, recreational facilities, businesses, churches, 
and other facilities where white people were able to 
attend. Blacks in the South bonded together as a united 
community and were forced to fight for their equal 
protection against state and local officials regardless of 
their economic or educational status. Middle class or poor, 
highly educated or poorly educated, urban and rural, blacks 
who suffered exclusion created a unified movement. Several 
(Kluger, 2004; Payne, 1995; Eyes on the Prize, 1986) have 
shown how this movement included both a group of political 
and religious leaders, many trained in passive resistance 
techniques, and rural grassroots sharecroppers unwilling to 
continue bowing to suppression and degradation by the white 
power establishment. As Berg (2005, p. 159) stated: “In 
order to overcome the lamentable state of apathy among 
potential black voters, the NAACP activists tried to make 
clear that political powerlessness and economic and social 
discrimination were two sides of he same coin”. Nossiter 
(1994, p. 40) documented, “By the mid-1940’s the NAACP was 
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an accepted part of the national political landscape, 
recognized as the premier advocate for black advancement”. 
The murder of fourteen year old Emmett Till in Money, 
Mississippi for allegedly whistling at the wife of a white 
drug store owner also helped create unity within the black 
community, important because it signified cultural 
collectivism in the face of oppression, and a need to stand 
together in defense of blacks’ rights (Berg, 2005; Crowe, 
2003; Williams, 1986). Although Till’s murderers were 
acquitted by an all-white jury, Till’s uncle had the 
courage to testify against two white men in a Mississippi 
court of law. 
Blacks were able to accomplish equal protection rights 
gradually as litigation moved slowly through the court 
system from 1954-64 (Irons, 2002; Tushnet, 1987). 
Recognition as a minority group may have contributed to 
some societal accommodations. Public opinion after World 
War II emerged to acknowledge blacks were a minority group 
that had been disenfranchised and excluded from general 
society (Kluger, 2004). Society owed them accommodations 
based upon wrongs inflicted from the past. However, 
scholars have over emphasized the value of this minority 
labeling as this chapter will highlight below. 
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Minority Labeling for the Disabled – Competing Philosophies 
 Scholars previously mentioned who were in agreement 
about minority status with blacks struggled whether the 
designation applied to the disabled population. 
Unfortunately, they wasted forty years of debate over a 
question that was unimportant for two reasons. First, 
minority status never was a significant factor when judges 
and legislators made determinations about due process for 
the disabled. Second, individuality and sensitivity to 
specific physical, mental, and learning disabilities were 
key to producing due process rights by the late 1960’s. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to review the argument so 
that scholars now may understand how previous theoretical 
ideas obstructed the true relationship between the BCRM and 
the DRM, and how disability rights legislation was created. 
The importance of this relationship occurred prior to the 
Brown case, not in the era following it. 
A review of key literature of minority labeling for 
disabled people was not unanimous and only evolved over a 
generation (1948-73). The notion of the disabled increasing 
their normality to compete with normal people on a normal 
playing field permeated psychology in the first half of the 
twentieth century in articles by psychologists like Sigmund 
Freud, John Watson and in the 1940’s and 1950’s by 
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behaviorists like B. F. Skinner. According to Barker, 
(1948) the disabled individual was not considered a 
minority group like a Jew or Negro because according to 
Barker (1948) he did not share a minority position with 
other similar individuals: “He is almost inevitably an 
isolated individual who must meet the limitations which his 
underprivileged status imposes without the possibility of 
group support” (p. 32). This position came into sharper 
focus when it became clear that disabled people were 
“spread across the various social classes and status groups 
in society”, (Scotch, 2001, p. 30) and that the disabled 
actually composed a cross-section of economic life in 
America, (Scotch, 1989, pp. 380-399) more so than did 
blacks. 
People with disabilities were isolated from each other 
for two reasons. First, they were usually living with 
families and out of touch with other disabled people, and 
second, they possessed a plethora of different disability 
types. According to Scotch (2001, p. 30) “Disability is an 
individual experience in most cases, and a community of 
disabled people may not exist unless it is consciously 
built”. It was evident to several scholars (Switzer, 2003; 
Gilson and Depoy, 2000; Covey, 1998) that disabled people 
did not consider themselves unified members with other 
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disability groups or united to a common cause. Switzer 
(2003, p. 14), for example, commented, “The lack of this 
common culture isolated the handicapped from each other, 
and the isolation was exacerbated by the fact that the 
handicapped differed greatly among themselves…” Scotch 
(1989) asserted that it was not until the early 1970’s that 
the name disability rights movement (DRM) emerged. At that 
time Seelman (1993, p. 122) contended “The leadership came 
from the ranks of people with disabilities who coalesced 
around a common experience of oppression”. 
Disabled individuals were unable to immediately 
benefit from the collective consciousness of the BCRM 
despite testimony to this effect by textbook authors, 
because there was no evidence they formed any cohesive 
groups or shared communication of their issues. As Mary 
Jane Owen lamented in “The Ragged Edge”, an edited journal 
for the disabled that began publication in 1984, disabled 
people were like “squabbling cubs”. “Why don’t we seem to 
“get it together” the way other civil rights movements 
have?” (Shaw, 1994, p.7). Evidence of non-recognition of 
minority status had been advanced by Osborne, (1996, p. 3) 
who noted for parents and advocates of disabled children, 
“The federal government did not require states to provide 
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special education services to students with disabilities 
until 1974”. 
As previously stated, scholars in key literature 
recognized that the DRM was influenced by actions, 
emotions, and events generated by the BCRM (Rothman, 2003; 
Scotch, 2001; Bryan, 1996; Osbourne Jr., 1996; Turnbull 
III, 1986). However, they cited Brown as the instigating 
event and failed to document the influence of the BCRM 
prior to Brown. They failed to do this because they chose 
to categorize each movement as a group with a collective 
consciousness, when, unlike the unified consciousness of 
blacks, a collective consciousness had not developed within 
the DRM until the early 1970’s, when several cases in 
litigation, that will be discussed later in this chapter, 
occurred. Some scholars failed to make the connection that 
successful DRM litigation was the result of precedence 
established by successful equal protection cases advanced 
by the BCRM from 1948-50. 
When scholars referred to Brown as a catalyst for a 
right to education for the disabled, they stressed the 
legal argument of class action and minority rights that 
allowed five cases to be bundled in one hearing as Brown by 
the Supreme Court. However, lost in the reasoning in Brown, 
along racial lines, was the loss of equal protection to the 
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direct petitioner’s involved. This individuality had been 
stressed in Gaines, Sipuel, McLaurin, and Sweat by the 
Justices, and generated a significant reasoning for their 
holding in the Brown decision (Brown v. Board of Education, 
(1954)). 
Later litigation by the DRM in the PARC and Mills 
cases, which will be elaborated below, made reference to 
Brown, not because of the class action argument, but 
because Brown had demonstrated denial of equal protection 
to distinct individuals. Litigation in DRM cases referred 
to the “intangible considerations” lost with segregation 
(Brown v. Board of Education (1954), p. 4). This loss was 
personal in nature and became the basis of argument in DRM 
litigation, the distinct character and value of the 
individual. The holding in the Mills case, citing Brown, 
identified that a privilege granted to one person should 
not be denied to another when it read, “Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, 
is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms” (Mills v. D.C. (1972), p. 9). This was the language 
of the Sipuel and Sweatt cases. So when scholars like 
Turnbull III and Osbourne Jr. cited Brown as the catalyst 
that propelled education for the disabled, their 
identification was correct, but they did not examine more 
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completely the individuality argument as well as class 
action. 
 Several scholars assumed a seamless transition of 
acquisition of due process occurred for the disabled only 
following the Brown case. On the other hand, others like 
Covey (1998) and Charlton (1998) maintained due process 
rights for the disabled did not seamlessly follow the 
successes blacks achieved in the early 1950’s because the 
disabled lacked the unified community spirit (Covey, 1998) 
and the recognized minority status (Charlton, 1998) blacks 
had achieved through their long historical fight against 
Jim Crow. Neither of these theories is correct because they 
failed to address the individuality and personal experience 
of the disabled as an individual. Previous scholars have 
failed to recognize the lack of importance or the 
irrelevancy of linkage between societal acceptance of 
minority status and eventual success at achieving due 
process. 
Scholars instead chose to examine this importance of 
establishing one’s self as a minority and its linkage 
toward attaining due process. This argument consumed a 
twenty-five year period from 1948-73 and is actually 
insignificant because it disassociates due process from the 
personal, individual right of an individual by categorizing 
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it on an impersonal group or race basis. The argument 
supporting or denying minority status is specious and 
unnecessary in discussing the BCRM/DRM relationship, 
nevertheless, it occupied copious amounts of literature. 
The number of scholars who maintained the argument 
that one difficulty disabled individuals faced was lack of 
recognition as a minority group both by themselves and 
society was pervasive {Switzer, 2003; Mansbridge & Morris, 
2001; Bryan, 1996; Nagler, 1993). Nagler (1993, p. 33) 
stated that the disabled did not constitute a 
“group in the sociological sense…Differing in a 
sociological sense from other groups, the disabled do 
not have constituents such as a common culture, mores, 
folkways, laws, and a sense of ‘peoplehood’”. They 
lacked an‘esprit de corps’ that is necessary for group 
consciousness. 
Mansbridge and Morris (2001, p. 95) concurred in this 
finding. “Lacking the necessary structural and cultural 
conditions, individuals with disabilities did not form a 
broad-based oppositional consciousness until the early 
1970’s”. Richard Scotch, often recognized as the foremost 
scholar of the Disability Rights Movement and public policy 
since writing his Harvard doctoral dissertation in 1984, 
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did believe the disabled possessed a social movement at 
least by 1962. According to Switzer (2003, p. 71) 
“Scotch believes that until the mid-1970’s the 
disability rights movement was a loosely structured 
grassroots movement. There were few resources 
available, “leadership by example”, and only 
occasional focusing events that brought activists 
together. He noted that there are no aggregate data on 
individual or organizational participants in the 
disability rights movement…”. 
Two Treatment Models for the Disabled 
The battle of existence of collective identity and 
whether disabled people should passively accept their 
disability or whether society should accommodate to a 
disability grew intense after Roger Barker (1948, pp. 28-
37) first addressed the issue of a collective consciousness 
among the disabled in an article entitled The Social 
Psychology of Physical Disability in the Journal of Social 
Issues in 1948. In constructing what he referred to as a 
“medical model”, Barker claimed disabled people were a 
minority-group, but whether they possessed a collective 
will to constitute what Scotch (1989) would later call a 
“social movement” depended upon their psychological 
response to their environmental condition; their 
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understanding that they live in a “built” world of 
physical, social, and emotional barriers to which they must 
adapt to be accepted into a general societal framework. 
What he meant was that although the disabled saw themselves 
as different from normal people, they had accepted their 
inequality and expected to be treated unequally by 
mainstream culture. Therefore, they were resigned to their 
inferiority status. This resignation would better help them 
integrate to their condition in society.  
This perspective was still alive but faintly breathing 
by 1988 when Fine and Asch (1988) were two of the last 
proponents to revive this psychological/medical framework 
of minority group by referencing a statement by Meyerson in 
the same 1948 Journal of Social Issues “that the problems 
of the handicapped are not physical, but social and 
psychological” (p. 7). This implied that disabled 
individuals as a distinct minority would have to 
psychologically accept their condition as medically 
incompetent in an environment that existed as reality. They 
had to conform to the general culture rather than insist 
the general culture create accommodations for their 
acceptance. However, oppositional viewpoints during the 
years following Barker’s view expounded below by other 
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scholars had determined this medical model was dead on 
arrival by the 1970’s.  
Scotch, (1989, p. 381) of course, disagreed with this 
medical model framework. Rather, he claimed that society 
was responsible for adapting to the disabled. “The disabled 
constituted a social movement because they met criteria of 
collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or 
resist change in the society or group of which it is a 
part”. Evidence of this collectivity and society’s 
responsiveness occurred when Ed Roberts formed the Center 
for Independent Living (CIL) and fought for more 
independent housing at Berkeley. Additionally, Judy 
Heumann, previously a disabled second grade teacher turned 
community activist, was able to organize a group that 
engineered a sit-in at President Nixon’s re-election 
headquarters in 1972 to protest better transportation for 
disabled workers. 
Sharon Groch (Mansbridge & Morris, 2001, p. 65) 
reinforced the notion of collective consciousness and 
community responsibility to accommodation by insisting the 
disabled met five criteria for oppositional consciousness 
that beckoned for accommodation because they: 1) see 
themselves as members of a group, 2) regard their life 
situation as unjust, 3) find common interest with other 
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group members to oppose the injustice, 4) regard the 
injustice is due to structural inequalities, and 5) believe 
the justice can be terminated or diminished by collective 
action. She was able to cite as evidence that the disabled 
demanded accommodations in the strike against public 
transportation in Denver in 1978 because of a lack of 
wheelchair lifts on buses. 
Consequently, according to the viewpoints of Scotch 
and Groch, it can be argued that it was society that must 
accommodate to the individual needs of the disability to 
promote more inclusion, not the individual’s responsibility 
to succumb and to accept the existing environment. Covey 
(1998, p. 3) supported this notion by stating, “A handicap 
is not determined by an individual’s physical limitations, 
but instead reflects the social consequences of that 
disability”.   
Adding to the confusion of identity awareness, Gilson 
and Depoy (2000, p. 211) took a double-sided approach that 
“disability identity can be viewed as internally derived or 
externally imposed depending on definitional lenses”. From 
this perspective, Fine & Asch (1988) and Barker (1948) have 
argued that society can impose a medical model of 
constriction on the disabled individual where he must 
measure up to societal norms in order to join. On the other 
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hand, other scholars who supported Scotch and Groch 
maintained the collective identity model. A disabled person 
can create a collective identity with like-minded disabled 
others to form a social movement that challenges the 
majority to make accommodations so they may enter it 
(Switzer, 2003; Mansbridge & Morris, 2003; Bryan, 1996; 
Zola, 1989). 
James Charlton (1998, pp. 83-84) in his book Nothing 
About Us Without Us made a strong statement that disabled 
people should control their own destiny in society, but 
society owes them the right to compete with necessary 
accommodations. According to Charlton, disabled individuals 
were faced with seven features of societal oppression in 
everyday life: 1) invisibility, 2) lack of support 
services, 3) control by charities, 4) hierarchy of 
disabilities, 5) vulnerability to violence, 6) 
inaccessibility, and 7) chasm between rural and urban life. 
In his view, mainstream society must initiate an attitude 
adjustment to even the playing field for disabled people. 
Finally, researchers like Switzer (2003), Gilson & 
Depoy, (2000) Scotch, (1989) Bryan, (2002; 1996) and Zola 
(1989) pointed out, that beginning in the 1960’s, members 
of the disabled became more familiar with the collective 
consciousness of other social movements such as the Anti-
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War, Women’s, Gay Right’s, Latino, etc. The notion that 
disabled people could constitute a collective consciousness 
with power to demand societal accommodations began to 
outweigh the medical group model previously advocated by 
Barker, and Fine and Asch: minorities must psychologically 
adjust to the environment they faced.  
As Gilson & Depoy (2000, p. 208) noted citing French, 
“A social model of disability is socially constructed…a 
social model of disability sets service goals as removal of 
social and environmental barriers to full social, physical, 
career and spiritual participation. 
Unimportance of Minority Status 
Despite twenty-five years of rhetoric of who 
constituted minority status, I have discovered the issue 
had no bearing when blacks sought equal protection or the 
disabled due process. What mattered more was the personal 
denial of civil rights to the individual. Blacks obtained 
justice from the Supreme Court from key Court cases that 
occurred between 1948-50, which will be explained below. 
Advocates of the disabled were able to utilize holdings 
from those cases to emphasize due process for the 
individual. The history of the Brown case (Brown v. Board 
of Education (1954)) will be studied to demonstrate that it 
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was not the defining case for due process of the disabled 
that most scholars have interpreted.  
History of Brown and the Legal Defense Team 
 That the Brown case ever reached the Supreme Court in 
the spring of 1954 is testimony to a group of highly 
talented black lawyers who struggled throughout the 1940’s 
against racial subordination. They worked for the Legal 
Defense Team of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, an organization founded in 
1909 “by a biracial group desiring to counter an increase 
in white violence against blacks throughout the country” 
(Tushnet, 1987, p. 1). Proof that the NAACP Legal Defense 
Team was instrumental in bringing black civil rights to the 
forefront within the federal court system was Walter’s 
(1992) claim that prior to action by the NAACP beginning in 
the 1940’s, “There are no known efforts of blacks in 
Mississippi to integrate public places other than a boycott 
of public transportation in 1904”, (p. 91) an effort that 
failed because blacks had no support in the courts. Watson 
(2010 p. 41) indicated that while Mississippi’s population 
in 1900 was 62.5 percent black, “the state had not one 
black elected official”. Vann Woodword (1966) indicated in 
his book, The Strange Career of Jim Crow that white power 
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in the state of Mississippi was absolute – a complete 
police state for blacks.  
Beginning in the 1930’s, acting secretary of the 
NAACP, Walter White, assembled a talented team of black 
attorneys, mostly graduates of Howard University, to 
represent the organization “for an intensive campaign 
against specific handicaps facing the Negro” in the area of 
segregation (Tushnet, 1987, p. 15). According to Anderson 
and Byrne, (2004, p. 27) lawyer Nathan Margold was hired to 
develop a “strategy to positively affect the legal status 
of blacks in the United States”. The plan, known as the 
Margold Report, was designed to be an all out attack 
against racial segregation in the Jim Crow South. 
As Anderson and Byrne (2004, p. 27) reported, White 
hired Charles Houston, Dean of Howard University’s law 
school, to represent the NAACP’s legal defense team 
permanently in 1935 to litigate “planned test cases across 
the country to generate favorable legal precedents”. By 
1950 the team had added two highly competent attorneys and 
graduates of Howard University, Robert L. Carter and 
Thurgood Marshall They had argued four equal protection 
cases from 1948-50 where blacks had been denied higher 
education. However, as Irons discovered, (2002, p. 12) if 
blacks would be successful at acquiring equal protection 
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rights,  “The heart of the Jim Crow system, and the 
institution most central to its functioning was the public 
School system”. 
Under Charles Houston’s guidance it was Redding, 
Carter, Marshall, and Spottswood Robinson, another gifted 
black attorney, who argued a series of bundled cases, two 
from Delaware and one each from Virginia, South Carolina, 
and the District of Columbia known as Brown v. Board of 
Education ( Kluger, 2004; Irons, 2002). Richard Kluger 
(2004) eminently described the case in his book Simple 
Justice. These cases centered upon petitioners who 
represented model clients: employed, middle class, hard 
working, stable family structure, and respected in the 
community. According to Irons (2002) and Tushnet, (1987) 
race had been the exclusionary factor in denying inclusion 
in the K-12 public schools. However, equal protection cases 
argued by the Legal Defense Team were decided by 
acknowledging personal individuality as well as race.  
Several civil rights authors (Anderson and Byrne, 
2004; Gray, 2002; Irons, 2002; Tushnet, 1987) have argued 
that attorneys were critical at pressing for individual 
rights and dignity for black people, coordinating organized 
local resistance to segregationist policies, and appealing 
this resistance through federal courts. Tushnet (1987, p. 
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145) noted how Lawyers for the NAACP “identified not a 
single target but a group of generically defined evils --- 
school segregation, lynch law, Jim Crow laws --- and 
directed its efforts at those broadly defined evils”. The 
Court agreed to hear these cases collectively on December 
9-11, 1953. 
Byrnes and Anderson (2004, p. 29) reported “This 
grouping was significant because it showed that school 
segregation was a national issue, not just a southern one”. 
Anderson and Byrnes (2004) and Tushnet (1987)) reasoned 
that to strengthen its case, the NAACP Legal Defense Team 
presented plaintiffs who possessed credibility, and they 
would likely impress liberal justices with their high moral 
character, family values, and strong work ethic. Irons 
(2002) maintained the credibility of plaintiffs in the 
Brown case had a profound effect on how the justices viewed 
segregated education. 
The Supreme Court justices ruled 9-0 in favor of the 
plaintiffs. Their equal protection rights were being denied 
because of race. While Turnbull III (1986) indicated race 
appeared to be a hot-button issue that excluded disabled 
children could utilize in their fight for inclusion, key 
literature (Hardeman et al., 2008; Gearheart et al., 1996) 
did not support that a great degree of movement toward 
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inclusion of the disabled in public schools occurred 
following Brown.  
Impact on the DRM 
Both Cremins (1983) and Turnbull III (1986) noted that 
this judgment had no immediate effect upon disabled 
students other than to demonstrate to their advocates that 
litigation and not legislation would be the initial avenue 
for them to pursue due process and inclusion. Advocates 
realized skillful attorneys as demonstrated by the Legal 
Defense Team would be valuable assets in the fight for due 
process. What Brown did demonstrate was that equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment was a culmination 
of several prior cases that the Legal Defense Team had 
adjudicated between 1948-1950. 
Yet educational and historical scholars (Kluger, 2004; 
Daugherty, 2001; Kirk, 2000; Payne, 1995; Branch, 1998; 
Tushnet, 1987) have noted little linkage between these 
earlier cases in regard to the BCRM’s relationship to what 
would become the DRM.  These scholars have detailed how an 
emphasis on the BCRM and its effects on other movements 
have often centered on its tactics such as demonstrations, 
marches, sit-ins, and boycotts and the leadership ability 
of able preachers of noted divinity schools like Martin 
Luther King Jr., Rev. Ralph Abernathy, Rev. Fred 
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Shuttlesworth, and blacks in leadership positions with 
positive ties to the white community like A. Phillip 
Randolph (Porters’ Union) and E. D. Nixon (Montgomery 
NAACP). While the DRM was propelled to emulate the tactics 
and leadership of the BCRM in its early years, its success 
at achieving due process for disabled students resulted 
initially from resorting to litigation in a similar fashion 
as the BCRM had employed prior to Brown, stressing personal 
rights of the individual. Scholars who narrated this did 
not particularly denote it (Osbourne Jr., 1996; Turnbull 
III, 1986; Cremins, 1983). As an example, in the Wyatt v. 
Hardin (1967) case in Alabama, the district court ordered 
the institution housing mentally challenged individuals to 
uphold what became known as “Wyatt Standards”, one of which 
required “individual treatment plans” (Wyatt v. Alabama, 
1967, p. 5).  
Precedent Cases in the BCRM Prior to Brown 
 As previously argued, one reason why the DRM developed 
gradually was Switzer’s (2002) contention of the slow 
transformation of disabled people toward class-
consciousness. A second reason was Gilson and Depoy’s 
(2000) supposition of society’s slow movement of evolving 
expectancies of disabled people from paternalistic to 
independent. However, Scotch (2001) and Percy (1989) 
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indicated that leadership also affected how and when the 
disabled fought for their civil rights. Whereas a legal 
team of attorneys represented blacks, together with key 
preachers who were scholars of divinity schools with black 
church congregations where they could express their views, 
leaders of the DRM were middle class white college 
students, from both Coasts fighting for their individual 
and local interests (Scotch, 1989). It can be argued 
(Irons, 2002; Payne, 1995; Branch 1987) that blacks were 
unified in their mission to achieve equal protection and 
overcome Jim Crow Laws, while leaders of the DRM sought to 
overcome localized, personal difficulties like access to 
housing, mobility, and meaningful employment (Disability 
Rights and Independent Living Movement, 2009; Roberts, 
2007; A Discussion with Judy Heumann on Independent Living, 
2008). 
Judy Heumann related how in fighting for her teacher’s 
license she learned “when you begin to push, push, push, in 
many cases you can beat the system” (Heumann, 2008 p. 10).  
Leadership and localism of issues affected the speed of 
progress toward due process for the DRM. In the PARC (1972) 
and Mills (1972) cases leaders did however, copy the legal 
tactics of respect for the individual and the intrinsically 
personal nature of equal protection employed by the BCRM in 
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a series of cases from 1948-50, once lobbying groups for 
the DRM acquired enough political and public support to 
challenge the status quo during the period 1969-72. These 
cases will be itemized below. 
BCRM Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Brown 
 As early as 1938, the Supreme Court addressed the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
exclusion of blacks in the nation’s schools of higher 
education in Gaines v Canada (Gaines v Canada, 1938). 
William Hogsett and Fred L. Williams of the Legal Defense 
Team argued the case. Lloyd Gaines was a student who had 
earned a Bachelor’s degree from an all black College and 
sought to enter the University of Missouri Law School. A 
state statute offered to pay tuition for admission to a law 
school in an adjoining state, but did not allow admission 
of black students into Missouri’s law school. The Supreme 
Court struck down the state statute by reversing the 
decision of the District Court. Denying Gaines admission to 
Missouri’s law school amounted to violation of his equal 
protection rights. While Gaines was permitted to enroll, 
the issue was moot according to Irons, (2002) when Gaines 
moved away from Missouri and the state was never faced with 
the physical reality of providing a law school for members 
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of the black race or integrating its current white law 
school. 
 Building from the precedent of the Gaines case, 
Thurgood Marshall and Amos T. Hall argued Sipuel v. Board 
of Regents of University of Oklahoma (1948) before the 
Supreme Court, a similar case where a black female was 
denied entrance to the University of Oklahoma Law School 
solely because of race. The Court ruled “The state must 
provide it to her in conformity with the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon 
as it does for applicants of any other group” (Sipuel v. 
Oklahoma, 1948) p. 1). Significantly, the Court ruled that 
denial of equal protection rights to this petitioner was a 
personal affront, not just an injustice because of race. 
This ruling recognized the value of the individual for 
herself, not just because she was a member of a group or 
race. The Legal Defense Team with Marshall in charge chose 
to pursue other cases where denial of higher education was 
involved (Irons, 2002; Tushnet, 1987).  
 Two additional cases were argued on the same day in 
the 1950 term of the Supreme Court, both similar in their 
legal demands. Robert L. Carter in the lead with Thurgood 
Marshall, Amos T. Hall and three other members of the Legal 
Defense Team providing counsel on the brief, argued 
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McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950). This case involved a black 
doctoral student at the University of Oklahoma who was 
allowed to attend with white students, but was required to 
be segregated from them in his seating, studying, and 
eating environments. The Court addressed the specific 
question “whether a state may, after admitting a student to 
graduate instruction in its state university, afford him 
different treatment from other students solely because of 
his race” (McLaurin v. Oklahoma (1950) p. 2). 
The Court held that separating McLaurin from his 
fellow students infringed upon his ability to learn and 
“deprived him of his personal and present (author’s 
italics) right to the equal protection of the laws; and the 
Fourteenth Amendment precludes such differences in 
treatment by the State based upon race” (p. 1). This was a 
personal affront to his dignity as an individual. He was 
allowed to join his fellow white students. However, 
justices had noted this personal affront to him, and this 
holding was important because it was not determined purely 
on race. 
 Similarly, in Sweatt v. Painter (1950) Thurgood 
Marshall, Robert L. Carter, and others on the Legal Defense 
Team argued that a Texas law student was denied his equal 
protection rights when he was denied admission to the 
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University of Texas law school in exchange for the state’s 
creation of a Negro law school. They argued, again, that 
the plaintiff had been denied equal protection. The Court 
ruled the University of Texas law school was inherently 
superior to the newly created black law school. Therefore 
the separate but equal argument of Plessy v. Ferguson 
(1896) did not apply. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for 
the majority was careful to point out in his holding that 
this was a narrowly defined case based upon the two cases, 
Gaines and Sipuel, “which present the issue of the 
constitutional validity of race distinctions in state-
supported graduate and professional education” (Sweatt v. 
Painter (1950) p. 3). However, the Court recognized again 
the personal nature of rights when Justice Vinson stated: 
“”It is fundamental that these cases concern rights which 
are personal and present” (author’s italics). Significance 
lay in that the court recognized denial of equal protection 
affected the life of the individual and constituted more 
than a race based obstruction.  
 From these successes, Tushnet (1987) related that the 
NAACP had learned equal protection for blacks in higher 
education could be obtained through the nation’s courts 
through specific incidents when the issue of equal 
protection was personal and narrowly defined to pertain to 
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a specific individual. As Irons (2002) documented, by the 
early 1950’s, the Legal Defense Team realized if it 
intended to attack exclusion and segregation at a broader 
community level, it would have to create a series of cases 
at a lower educational level where a multitude of black 
children existed. This would be the K-12 grade level at 
regular public schools. Eventually, five cases bundled 
together are what became Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954). 
Due Process Supreme Court Decisions for Disability Rights 
While no immediate litigation success occurred for due 
process for educating disabled students from 1954-70, 
nevertheless, according to Cremins, (1983, p. 15) “It was a 
time of active parent organization, federal intervention, 
evolution of more and better preparation programs, 
research, etc.” Parent lobbying groups proliferated, 
especially among parents of students with intellectual 
impairments. 
The first major breakthrough for inclusion of disabled 
students occurred in Utah when parents filed suit against 
the state for denying two children with intellectual 
impairments admission to public school (Wolf v. Utah, 
1969). Here Osbourne (1996) argued, “The court in Wolf 
declared that children who were mentally retarded were 
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entitled to a free appropriate public education under the 
state constitution” (Osbourne Jr., 1996, p. 8). Osbourne 
Jr. demonstrated how current scholars like himself have 
missed the importance and impact of decisions like Gaines, 
Sipuel, McLaurin, and Sweatt prior to Brown that emphasized 
the personal and individualistic rights of the minority 
person rather than the class action remedy of Brown when he 
stated about the Wolf case, “The Court’s opinion reads 
remarkably similar to portions of the Brown desegregation 
opinion” (p. 8). By missing the relationship of Wolf to 
prior Brown cases, Osbourne Jr. failed to discern that 
success at litigation to achieve due process for the 
disabled depended on courts identifying with the individual 
rights of a single person, not necessarily identifying with 
class action suits in favor of a race or group. 
Success in the prior Brown cases was more effective in 
encouraging parents of the disabled to press for due 
process in their individual cases, although I have failed 
to discern in key literature any scholars who identified 
this strategy. Thus while scholars have emphasized Brown as 
a climactic case that opened the door of inclusion for 
other groups like the disabled, Brown could more correctly 
be described as a case that eliminated race and minority 
status as reasons for exclusion, and these two factors were 
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instrumental for this case to reach the supreme Court. I 
maintain that prior Brown cases that documented 
infringement of individual equal protection rights were 
more effective precedents for the disabled in their 
subsequent litigation. These cases were based upon 
infringement on a present, personal, and individualized 
basis. 
Political Support 
According to many scholars, (Hardman et. al., 2008; 
Switzer, 2003; Fleischer & Zames, 2001; Scotch, 2001; 
Kaplan, 1996; Percy, 1989) despite the influence of the 
BCRM, the DRM may not have pursued litigation for due 
process if the political will within the country had not 
existed in the 1960’s. According to Hardeman et al., (2008) 
mental retardation received prominent exposure with the 
election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 because Kennedy’s 
sister, Rose, was intellectually challenged. After his 
election, Kennedy listened to science experts who 
recommended alternative living programs to supplant the 
stodgy, unsuccessful benign neglect programs of the 1950’s, 
that continued to leave the intellectually challenged 
institutionalized. Having proposed an alternative competing 
philosophy for more productive lives for the disabled, 
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Kennedy sought to deinstitutionalize intellectually 
impaired patients. 
Many state institutions for the mentally challenged 
were closed during the 1960’s (Hardeman, 2008). Kennedy 
created the American Association on Mental Retardation 
(AAMR) and appointed Senator Hubert Humphrey as its first 
chairman. The President’s sister, Eunice Shriver, founded 
Special Olympics for disabled children. Consequently, 
disabled people were in the national consciousness, seen as 
individuals who could be productive, who could accomplish 
tasks if given opportunities. The House of Representatives 
conducted hearings in 1972, (U. S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, 
Subcommittee on Select Education, 1972) and acknowledged 
awareness of 40 million Americans with mental and physical 
handicaps who were underperforming economically in America. 
Rothstein (2000, p. 12) documented that “of the more than 
eight million children with disabilities in the United 
States, more than half were receiving either inappropriate 
or no educational service”. Advocates were able to gain 
significant attention to their lack of inclusiveness from 
legislators and courts by flooding U.S. district courts 
with due process cases from 1967-72 (Osbourne, Jr., 1996).  
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According to Scotch, (2001, p. 37) “In addition to grass-
roots advocacy and legislative activity, the federal courts 
became an arena for efforts to establish the rights of 
disabled people”. As lobbying groups for individuals with 
intellectual impairments gained more influence by 1970, 
they instituted litigation against school districts that 
refused to admit disabled students (Daugherty, 2001). 
Covey 1998) unfortunately missed the legal argument of 
individuality and loss of personal rights when he cited 
that advocates for the disabled saw themselves as a 
minority group similar to racial minorities who had been 
denied access to public education in the 1950’s, and they 
had used many of the same legal arguments against 
segregation blacks had used in Brown. However, he missed 
the point of the argument because once their cases were 
addressed, legal arguments in Wyatt, Diana, Wolf, PARC, and 
Mills actually centered on the personal rights of the 
individual. Scholars like Covey, who briefly summarized 
results of the litigation, have overlooked the importance 
of personal rights of the individual in these cases.  
There were several examples where federal district and 
appellate courts ruled in favor of Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection rights for the disabled. A Federal Appeals 
Court in Alabama, for example, under Judge Frank Johnson 
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ruled against Alabama state institutions for the mentally 
retarded for indiscriminate housing of mental impairment 
individuals (Wyatt v Hardin, 1971). This was seen as a 
breach of their constitutional right to receive treatment 
that would give them a realistic chance to be cured or to 
improve their mental condition (Irons, 2002). The ruling 
considered the individual member within the institution and 
that person’s individual need rather than the 
categorization of a group with intellectual impairments. It 
was ironic that Johnson was the same appellate judge who 
had previously mandated integration of James Meredith to 
Ole Miss in 1962. 
In a similar case in California, when mentally challenged 
students of color were overly represented in special 
education classes in California, parents were able to 
insist that students must be tested in their native or 
primary language for potential placement in a special 
education program as a distinct individual, not as a member 
of a specific racial or minority disability group. (Diane v 
California State Board of Education, 1970). What is 
important is for scholars to recognize that litigation for 
the disabled from 1967 onwards always followed a legal 
argument that rights for the individual were paramount, not 
rights for a group or race.  
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Beginnings of Leadership for the DRM 
 Prior to Brown, Scotch (1989; 2001) indicated 
that leadership of the disabled consisted of benevolent and 
charitable organizations absent any disabled individuals. 
Subsequent to Brown, a small cadre of disabled people drew 
inspiration from successes they observed from the BCRM. Ed 
Roberts, who will be depicted below, had stated: “I’m tired 
of well meaning noncripples {sic} with their stereotypes of 
what I can and cannot do directing my life and my future” 
(The Father of Independent Living, 2007, p. 2).  
Ed Roberts was representative of leaders of the DRM. 
He was a polio victim, disabled, white, college educated, 
and upper middle class. When he enrolled at the University 
of California at Berkeley in 1962, he was housed in the 
campus medical facility at Cowell Hall with other disabled 
students, a restrictive setting, where students were unable 
to perform living tasks with any degree of independence. 
While at Berkeley he fought to improve housing independence 
for the disabled. According to a biographical piece, (Ed 
Roberts, “The Father of Independent Living”, 2007, p. 1) 
“Ed was quick to grasp that the struggle for independence 
was not a medical or functional issue, but rather a 
sociological, political, and civil rights struggle”. 
Roberts sought to develop a “self help movement that would 
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radicalize how people with disabilities perceived 
themselves” (2007, p. 2). 
After establishing a campus organization for housing 
for the disabled, Roberts created an off campus community 
organization in Berkeley called the Center for Independent 
Living (CIL). CIL housed disabled individuals who wished to 
perform practical living skills more independently. After 
establishing a successful center for a number of years, 
California Governor Jerry Brown appointed him director of 
the state’s Vocational Rehabilitation Agency for housing in 
1975. 
Judy Heumann is also attributed as a beginning leader 
of the DRM based on her personal desire to become a New 
York City elementary teacher and the physical barriers 
imposed against her to prevent her from achieving that goal 
(McMahon and Shaw, 2000 p. 87-106). Heumann was a 
graduating senior with a teaching degree in May 1970 when 
she experienced difficulty obtaining her New York State 
teaching license. According to her interview, (A Discussion 
with Judy Heumann, 2008) She had successfully completed the 
necessary twelve academic credits, passed the oral and 
written exam, but failed the physical exam miserably 
because she was a victim of polio in a wheelchair. 
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Convinced she was a victim of discrimination, she was 
determined to receive her license. 
She contacted the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) and consulted a friend who was a reporter for The 
New York Times. The Times sent a reporter to record her 
story. A few days later an editorial appeared entitled: 
“You Can Be President, Not Teacher, with Polio (McMahon & 
Shaw, 2000, p. 97). The publicity helped her secure her 
license and a second grade-teaching job. 
More important, Heumann transitioned from teacher to 
advocate of the disabled. She founded Disabled In Action 
(DIA) in 1971, a support group for the disabled in 
Brooklyn, New York by networking with other disabled 
individuals who also experienced discrimination in 
employment. Through a series of meetings over several 
months, DIA was launched. Members grew more and more active 
and advocated for curb cuts and ramps to gain physical 
accessibility. “The group demonstrated against the Jerry 
Lewis telethon with its “Give it to the poor, pitiful, 
handicapped children” theme” (McMahon & Shaw, 2000, p. 99). 
Influenced by the work of Ed Roberts in the San 
Francisco Bay area, Heumann accepted Ed Robert’s invitation 
to join him on the CIL staff. Together they helped unite 
disabled people of California fighting for independent 
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living.  According to Heumann’s account, (A Discussion with 
Judy Heumann on Independent Living, 2008) they challenged 
the California Vocational Rehabilitation Agency in the 
early 1970’s to strengthen its employment program when it 
was apparent the need for employment of the disabled was 
not being sufficiently met. 
Heumann used her skills as an advocate to lobby 
California legislators to pass CIL legislation. By 1977 she 
had risen to Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) in the Carter Administration. Success in 
California had led to passage of federal CIL legislation in 
Washington in 1978. Heumann from the east coast and Roberts 
from the west coast had brought the issue of due process 
rights for the disabled into public view, and more 
importantly, to enactment of federal legislation, which 
will be discussed below. 
According to the Disability Rights and Independent 
Living Movement (DRILM) (The Bancroft Library, 2004, p. 1-
3) leadership of the DRM in the 1960’s surfaced on the East 
and West Coasts, Chicago, Texas, and Washington D. C. out 
of basic local needs of housing, transportation, and 
mobility to secure employment. These individuals were not 
members of a mass movement such as the BCRM, and they did 
not constitute an organizational chain of command with 
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various organizational strands and membership. These 
leaders were responding to local conditions where their 
independent living was jeopardized. According to Scotch 
(2001) and Fleischer and Zames, (2001) they sought to 
compete with normal society where accommodations would 
enable them access to employment, housing, transportation, 
and leisure on an equal and individualized basis; where 
recognition of their disability entailed due process and 
inclusion within normal society. According to Fleischer and 
Zames, (2001) they sought a hand up rather than a hand out, 
but most of all dignity rather than pity.    
Leaders of the DRM, who sought to increase their 
independence by improving their personal housing, 
transportation, and access to the environment, were faced 
with “biting the hand that fed them” because according to 
Percy (1989) demands for power, independence, and inclusion 
often clashed with powerlessness, dependence, and 
segregation associated with accepting charity. Yet without 
this charity, they were unable to compete in a normal world 
as Barker had constructed. While they worked to increase 
their independence and inclusion on local issues, they had 
no synchronization of organization.  Therefore, according 
to Rothman, (2003) Scotch, (2001; 1989) and Percy (1989) 
there was no mass movement of disability rights advocates 
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as there was for black civil rights during the 1950’s and 
early 1960’s, only localized areas where proponents 
operated without knowledge of others’ movements. 
According to these scholars, the DRM had no united 
grass roots movement from the bottom-up as had the BCRM. 
However, civil rights for the disabled had caught the 
attention of some major Congressional leaders, influenced 
by Robert’s and Heumann’s personal stories. Senate leaders 
(U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 
Subcommittee on the Handicapped, pp. 1-28, 1973) considered 
it imperative that more productivity should be brought 
forth for the nation’s 30 million disabled individuals by 
amending the 1972 Education of the Handicapped Act. The 
Subcommittee heard testimony that raising economic 
productivity of the disabled was a basic civil right. 
Now that disability terminology was linked to civil 
rights rather than entitlement rights, the 93rd Congress 
(U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 
Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973 pp.1-701) also 
recognized the disabled as a distinct minority class. This 
contentious although inconsequential designation was 
finally determined. 
I deduce these Congressional leaders became more 
responsive to the federal government’s involvement in due 
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process for the disabled when they admitted the linkage 
between civil rights and a minority group, although this 
linkage and its association with Brown’s legal argument was 
irrelevant and distracting to the actual argument of 
individual needs. Congress hoped that by creating 
legislation that produced greater inclusiveness, disabled 
individuals would deliver an economic payback once they 
were able to develop and display their skills and 
expertise. 
 However, with more opportunity came the necessity of 
societal accommodations so disabled individuals could 
compete with normal society (Kaplan, 1996). In their review 
of public policy toward the disabled, Scotch, (2001) 
Fleischer and Zames, (2001) and Percy (1989) corroborated 
that to increase societal involvement for the disabled 
meant that accommodations were essential, so the disabled 
could acquire access and mobility to produce economic 
performance. Foremost among societal inclusion was 
education. 
Major DRM Due Process Cases  
 Two federal district court cases that addressed due 
process rights for intellectually impaired K-12 students in 
1972 were the equivalent of the Brown decision for disabled 
students. Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens 
	  	  
75	  
(PARC) v. Pennsylvania was a class action suit on behalf of 
all retarded students ages 6-21 in Pennsylvania who were 
being denied access to public education by four state 
statutes. The plaintiff class sought to overturn the 
statutes as unconstitutional. Despite its class action 
nature, litigators were fastidious in recognizing the 
personal, individual rights of the seven individuals 
involved. Exclusions were justified only if a school 
psychologist certified a child was uneducable or 
untrainable. However, the Commonwealth could not foresee 
many instances, since education for self-improvement could 
be defined by many criteria other than academics (PARC v. 
Penn, 1972). 
Osbourne Jr. (1996, p. 8) noted, “The dispute was 
settled by a stipulation and consent agreement between the 
parties and the court”. The three-judge panel ruled that  
“Having undertaken to provide a free public education  
to all of its children, including its exceptional  
children, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not  
deny any mentally retarded child access to a free  
public program of education and training” (PARC v.  
Penn. (1972), p. 3).  
Although the case was argued as a class action suit, 
legal representation stressed that each child should be 
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educated based on his or her individual need to acquire the 
greatest amount of independence, and that individual 
education plans (IEP) be created for each student. Thus it 
can be argued that the legal principal of free appropriate 
public education for each individual student (FAPE) was 
established Daugherty, 2001; Turnbull III, 1986; Ballard et 
al., 1982). 
This case was also important because it declared that 
all children were teachable and could learn, and that 
learning need not pertain specifically to academics but 
also included developmental skills like self-help, 
communication, and functional academics. Functional 
academics were defined as achieving reading and 
mathematical ability at a fourth grade level. As a result, 
parents obtained due process rights since school officials 
were restricted from placing students with intellectual 
impairments in exclusionary special education programs 
without permission. 
 The second major due process case occurred in the 
District of Columbia (Mills v. D. C. (1972). This case 
extended free appropriate public education to students of 
other disability groups: hyperactive, emotionally 
disturbed, epileptic, orthopedically impaired, and learning 
disabled. As Abeson (1973) noted, these students had been 
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excluded from D. C. schools, approximately 18,000 out of 
22,000. It was shown that the District knew these students 
resided in the school census tract, but had failed to bring 
them into school. The District was ordered to “go find” 
these students. According to Trumbull III, (1986) finding 
these students was the creation of the special education 
principle of excluding no student, designated by the 
district court as the principle of “zero reject”. 
A major significance of the Mills case was the court’s 
refusal to accept a lack of funding as an excuse to exclude 
disabled students. As a result, the school district was 
ordered to provide due process safeguards before any 
student could be excluded (Abeson. 1973; Mills v. D. C.). 
Osbourne Jr. (1996) argued that these safeguards later 
formed the foundation for due process that was mandated in 
the federal education statute. 
While school districts might bristle and complain 
about the high cost of providing for large numbers of 
disabled students with various individual needs, Turnbull 
III, (1986) Mills v. D C. (1972), and Sipuel (1948) 
maintained that cost had never been accepted as an excuse 
to exclude disabled students by federal courts during 
litigation. While blacks had faced hostile whites whose 
simplistic denial of civil rights were because of 
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prejudice, the disabled faced a more sophisticated denial: 
thrifty school boards who presented economic constraints as 
justification to deny inclusion. 
Litigation and Beginning Congressional Activity 
During 1971 and 1972 the number of cases litigated for 
inclusion and the right to an education proliferated in 
federal district courts. Alan Abeson, Director, State 
Federal Information Clearinghouse for Exceptional Children, 
presented findings to the Subcommittee on the Handicapped 
within the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
during committee hearings on March 20, 1973. During his 
presentation he submitted a paper entitled: A Continuing 
Summary of Pending and Completed Litigation Regarding the 
Education of Handicapped Children. The paper highlighted 21 
cases involving the right to an education, six cases 
demanded the right to adequate treatment, and among them 
were six cases that requested appropriate placement for 
disabled students. All twenty-one of these cases cited by 
Abeson identified lack of due process rights as their main 
concern (U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973, pp. 39-
153). 
 According to Abeson, the explosion in the numbers of 
due process cases by the time of the Senate Labor Committee 
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Hearings in March 1973 could be attributed to society’s 
gradually changing perception of disabled people as 
individuals who needed job skills, and disabled individuals 
who desired independence and the opportunity to develop 
their own skills. Disabled people like Roberts and Heumann 
came forward outside of formal Congressional hearings, and 
indicated they desired independence and a level playing 
field in order to compete and be included in society, not 
sheltered, and protected from it. 
A second reason mentioned by several scholars for 
increased litigation was the proliferation of parent groups 
who were able to lobby for their disabled children 
(Switzer, 2003; Fleischer & Zames, 2002; Scotch, 2001; 
Percy, 1989; Broudy, 1983). As Covey (1998) detailed, these 
parents flooded district courts in 1971-72 with class 
action suits using arguments similar to those employed by 
BCRM attorneys from 1948-50, namely, that equal protection 
rights of the individual were paramount to any restrictive 
state statute. Since the federal government provided 
funding to the states for special education programming, 
these court cases emphasized due process under the Fifth 
Amendment, equivalent to states’ insurance of equal 
protection, under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 – Section 504 Due Process 
 While increased litigation in the 1970’s for due 
process may have accentuated media attention for the DRM 
movement, Scotch (2001) and Percy (1989) argued that 
Congress was already greatly influenced by the Disability 
Rights movement by spring 1973 to enact legislation to 
increase societal inclusion and improve economic 
underperformance of disabled people. According to Bryan, 
(2001, p. 33) “In the early 1970’s, rehabilitation leaders 
backed by disability rights groups began to push for 
changes in the legislation to advocate a broader non-
vocational role for rehabilitation programs”. Disability 
rights organizations, which had gained considerable 
experience in politics, coalition building, lobbying, and 
compromising had challenged lawmakers to act. They had 
effectively developed a friendly base of Congressmen like 
John Brandeis and Senators Alan Cranston, Randolph 
Jennings, and William Stafford. Some Congressmen themselves 
with disabled family relatives related to the DRM. Among 
these friends were Senators Hubert Humphrey and Charles 
Vanik. Humphrey had been active with organizations lobbying 
for the intellectually impaired and Vanik had a 
granddaughter with mental retardation. 
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Previously, on January 20, 1972 Senator Humphrey had 
introduced a bill that attempted to amend the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 in order to prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of physical or mental handicap in federally assisted 
programs. Humphrey proclaimed: “The time has come when we 
can no longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped 
in America…I am insisting that the civil rights of 40 
million Americans now be affirmed… (Scotch, 2001, p. 43). 
While the bill languished and finally died in 
committee, its sentiments reappeared in March 1973 when the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare conducted 
hearings to consider reauthorization of the vocational 
rehabilitation program within the Rehabilitation Act of 
1972 (P.L. 93-112). In conjunction with the House Committee 
on Education and Labor, the committees scheduled hearings 
with intent to pass a bill that expanded and improved the 
vocational rehabilitation program. 
According to testimony by advocates of the disabled 
like South Carolina state Senator James Waddell, Jean 
Garvin, Director of Special Education for Vermont, William 
Geer, Executive Director of the Council for Exceptional 
Children, and John Nagle, Chief of the Washington office of 
the National Federation of the Blind, to name a few, (U.S. 
Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee 
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on the Handicapped, 1973) proponents emphasized preparation 
for work and independent living over vocational training, 
and creation of a general rehabilitation program for more 
severely disabled people unable to work. During testimony 
before the subcommittee, proponents on increasing funding 
for the Rehabilitation Act stressed economic advantages. 
John F. Nagle, Chairman of the Washington office of the 
National Federation of the Blind, remarked, 
“The real question, the only question, is whether 
large sums of money should be used to educate 
handicapped children toward useful, productive and 
taxpaying lives as handicapped adults, or whether far 
larger sums of money should be expended for the 
maintenance and support of the handicapped for all of 
their lives” (Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973 
p.243). 
Actor Lloyd Nolan, the father of an autistic son, noted, 
“It seems we have a clearcut case. We can educate the 
children at a cost of as much as $50,000; or we can let 
them rot, and that will cost us about a quarter of a 
million” (Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973 p. 200). 
Referring toward increasing self-sufficiency for the 
disabled, James Gallagher, Director of the Frank Graham 
Porter Clinic for Child Development at the University of 
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north Carolina, offered, “What we also know is that this is 
not just a humanitarian thing to do, but this is an 
economical and practical thing to do” (Subcommittee on the 
Handicapped, 1973 p. 350). 
Interestingly, those opposed to the bill were not 
conservative legislators. “Rather, the opposition 
apparently came from those who were committed to protecting 
the groups already covered by Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act, notably blacks” (Scotch, 2001). Francis and Silvers 
(2000) noted that during an interview session between civil 
rights leader Stokeley Carmichael and Ed Roberts of the 
Council for Independent Living, Carmichael had denied their 
causes were the same. Francis and Silvers (2000, p. xvii) 
indicated in regard to the disabled, that for years prior 
to passage of the Civil Right Act of 1964, “few provisions 
to relieve people with disabilities of their exclusion from 
the opportunities available to everybody else were 
integrated into comprehensive legislation aimed at 
safeguarding them along with other minorities”. 
Within this context of time, Congress was also 
challenging the Executive in the area of civil rights 
(Scotch, 2001). Nick Edes, for example, a legislative aide 
to Senator Harrison Williams, described 1972 as a 
confrontational time between the executive and legislative 
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branches as to who would administer social policy, with a 
President who was impounding appropriated Congressional 
funds. According to Scotch, (2001, p. 48) Edes contended, 
“It was a time for sweeping gestures, attempts to help 
people, with social and economic costs considered not as 
important as potential benefits and the political 
opportunities that might be gained”. 
During Subcommittee hearings in March 1973, several 
proponents for reauthorizing the Rehabilitation Act 
promoted civil rights for the disabled. Minority chairman 
Senator Stafford remarked, “It is a legal right and it has 
been established now in many court cases that handicapped 
youngsters have a right in this country to an equal 
education” (U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 1973, p. 211). At 
the same Subcommittee hearing when referring to DRM 
litigation, Dr. Gallagher stated, “These legal suits make 
the case that the State has an obligation to provide 
appropriate educational services for all handicapped 
children” (p.349). Ultimately, Turnbull III (1986) and 
Shrybman (1982) denoted that the focus of the 
rehabilitation program in the reauthorization bill shifted 
from vocational to civil rights and anti-discrimination 
against disabled people because four amendments were added 
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that guaranteed due process. They were known as Sections 
501, 502, 503, and-504. As Percy (1989, p. 64) noted, “With 
the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504 
became law, following in the footsteps of other civil 
rights laws”. 
 Scotch (2001) informed us that Congressman John 
Brandemas, chairman of the House Committee on Education and 
Labor, did the majority of the footwork on the House floor, 
but Senators Alan Cranston and Harrison Williams took on 
the mantle of civil rights over vocational rights for the 
disabled in the Senate Committee. As Scotch (2001) and 
Percy (1989) detailed in the legislative history of the 
bill, the bill was “marked up” and sent to committee 
staffers to be compromised. Senate Staff members included 
Michael Burns, Jonathan Steinberg, Nik Edes, Lisa Walker, 
Patria Forsythe, and Robert Humphreys on the Democratic 
side and Michael Francis and Roy Millenson on the 
Republican side of the aisle. House Staffers trying to 
arrange a compromise bill included Jack Duncan for the 
Democrats and Martin Lavor for Republicans.  
 As it was initially drafted, the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 did not include Section 504, which according to 
Shrybman (1982, p. 29) “is the basic civil rights provision 
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for ending discrimination against America’s handicapped 
citizens”. Section 504 states, 
“No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States… shall, solely by reason of his handicap, 
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance” (Rehabilitation Act of 1973, p. 41; 
Shrybman, p. 29). 
 The insertion of Section 504 originated in August 
1973, when staffers were completing language on the bill. 
(Scotch, 2001) indicated a fear existed that once disabled 
individuals had received training, employers might 
discriminate against them and refuse to hire them. They 
wished to insert a civil rights provision similar to Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, but these staffers were not 
experienced in the area of civil rights. However, Scotch 
(2001) reported that they had previously done work in civil 
rights on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
Title VII that dealt with employment and affirmative 
action. Thus it was evident that their linkage to the civil 
rights movement in the past benefited the disabled with 
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respect to getting an Act passed with a strongly affirmed 
civil rights amendment.  
 The most important provision was Section 504. Here 
was the equivalent of Title VI in the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 that had guaranteed blacks their equal protection 
rights. Ironically, when the bill came to the floor for 
debate, Section 504 was not mentioned nor debated. 
Lawmakers failed to realize the longstanding impact Section 
504 would play in the future for civil rights for the 
disabled. National media attention was muted compared to 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
President Nixon signed the bill into law on September 
29, 1973. According to Scotch (2001) and Schrybman (1982) 
the President paid little to no attention to the Section 
504 anti-discrimination provision that would cost millions 
to the federal government in later years. Staffers had 
added the provision as an afterthought. Scotch (2001, p. 
49) summed up passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by 
remarking, “As it was initially drafted, the legislation 
did not include Section 504. Nor was Section 504 suggested 
at any of the hearings held on the proposed law”. Rather, 
Roy Millenson of Senator Javits staff had been involved in 
the development of the Education Amendments. He was able to 
integrate a civil rights statement with language from Title 
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VI and insert it at the end of the bill. Hence it received 
the name Section 504. Covey (2002, p. 173) argued that the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 meant “a new view of what 
rehabilitation was” and “persons with disabilities being 
identified as a “minority class” of citizens of a distinct 
nature, not simply aggregated with other minority 
categories”.  
As it evolved, Section 504 became a strong civil rights 
plank for the disabled in the Rehabilitation Act Amendments 
of 1973, (P.L. 93-112) according to Daugherty, (2001) 
Osbourne Jr., (1996) and Turnbull III (1986) because 
bureaucrats within the Office of the Handicapped within the 
Education Department sought to implement it whenever 
provision of the Rehabilitation Act needed interpretation. 
This Office for the Handicapped (OCR) within the Education 
Department had been created with passage of the 
Rehabilitation Act, and its officers became strong 
supporters on disability civil rights after 1973, often 
challenging federal interpretation of rehabilitation rules 
and regulations. Thus a precedent was established intoned 
by several scholars (Switzer, 2003; Fleischer & Zames, 
2001; Shrybman, 1982) where with each interpretive ruling, 
disabled individuals gained greater due process.  
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Genesis of the Education for All Handicapped Act 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 guaranteed due process 
rights to disabled adults involved in federally funded 
activities. There was as yet, of course, no legislation 
protecting children, only rights won through litigation in 
federal courts in the judicial branch of the government. 
This was to change as documented by Ballard et al., (1982) 
the National Education Association, (1978) and Abeson et 
al. (1975) in their histories of the genesis of the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (P.L. 94-142). 
This change occurred once public awareness had been 
created, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 had passed, and the 
government accepted the disabled as a distinct minority. 
Switzer’s (2003, p. 75) historical analysis that “disabled 
people do not speak with one voice” had been altered.  
Legislation for a FAPE is Enacted 
 Given the highly charged atmosphere of litigation, the 
conclusion of House and Senate hearings that emphasized 
greater productivity for the disabled, and passage of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 affirming civil rights for the 
disabled, the 94th Congress met in session to extend funding 
for the states for special education with Public Law 93-
380. Turnbull III (1986, p. 14) noted that Congress 
realized “its 1974 law was an interim measure only and 
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would have to be supplanted”. Parent lobbying groups, 
increased media attention of alternative treatment and 
educational programs for the disabled, and demonstrations 
and testimonials from disabled people themselves who pushed 
for greater independence and the right to pursue more 
fulfilling economic and social roles were also pressuring 
Congress. 
Senator Harrison with 29 co-sponsors introduced the 
EHA, on January 15, 1975 as Senate Bill Six (Library of 
Congress, 1/14/11). Cremins (1983) argued that it became 
the landmark legislation statute passed by Congress during 
the decade of the seventies. It passed the Senate on June 
18, 1975 and the House on July 29, 1975. President Ford 
signed it into law as P. L. 94-142 on November 29, 1975. 
 According to Turnbull III, (1986) Cremins, (1983) 
and NEA, (1978) the law mandated a free appropriate public 
education for all children aged three to twenty-one.  A 
multidisciplinary team must evaluate each child, the 
results of which were to yield an individualized education 
plan (IEP). The plan must specify the child’s present level 
of performance, annual short and long-term goals for 
instruction, services to be provided, and a schedule of 
implementation in the least restrictive environment, and 
criteria for evaluating pupil progress. Parents obtained 
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due process rights to challenge assessment, identification, 
and placement for their children. 
States were ordered to develop a plan for education of 
special education students and have the plan approved by 
the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) within the Department of 
Education by September 1977. The plan must address six 
principles of due process: 1) zero reject, 2) testing, 
classification and placement, 3) individualized and 
appropriate education, 4) least restrictive environment, 5) 
procedural due process, and 6) Parent participation and 
shared decision making (Turnbull III, 1986; NEA, 1978; 
Abeson et. al., 1975). This legislation protecting due 
process rights for children under the federal Fifth 
Amendment was equivalent to states’ equal protection rights 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. 
Since 1977 all fifty states have submitted special 
education plans to the Office of Special Education and 
Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) within the Department of 
Education in Washington, D.C. States have received annual 
funding from Congress, albeit never at the forty percent 
proposed funding level originally designed. Turnbull III 
(1986) has verified that cost has continually been a 
nagging factor affecting the establishment and maintenance 
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of special education programs in every school district in 
the United States, with many states siphoning funds from 
their regular education budgets to satisfy the due process 
mandates of special education required by the EHA. 
Conclusion 
 In summary, the Disability Rights Movement owes its 
success at achieving due process to the BCRM and the Legal 
Defense Team who waged an aggressive campaign from 1948-50 
that convinced the Supreme Court in several cases that 
denial of higher education in a white environment was an 
infringement of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to black students in an individualized and 
personal manner. Recognition of this infringement by the 
Court on a class basis reached a culmination with the Brown 
case in 1954. Accordingly, a small number of leaders with 
disabilities were influenced by the achievements of the 
BCRM, and within the context of competing minority group 
movements of the times, advocated for their personal 
rights, their right to compete on a level playing field 
within normal society, where their disability was accepted 
as part of who they were, as opposed to something they must 
overcome to obtain inclusion. 
DRM leaders like Ed Roberts and Judy Heumann educated 
themselves to enter the governmental power structure, and 
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some influential federal Congressmen recognized the 
importance of securing increased economic performance from 
the disabled. Legislation was crafted from 1973-75 that 
guaranteed civil rights to the disabled and recognition as 
a distinct minority. The Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act (P.L. 94-142) promised a free appropriate 
public education (FAPE) for students aged three to twenty-
one in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 
According to Clarizio, (1983) the shift of societal 
perception of disabilities toward more productivity changed 
expectations from one of paternalism to more independence. 
With this independence, disabled individuals required more 
accommodations to become inclusive and adapt to what Smart 
(2001, pp. 36-38) called an environmental model of 
inclusion. A changing perception of disabled people fueled 
a change in methodological outlook from a medical model of 
entitlements, training, and subservience by mainstream 
society to a more psycoeducational outlook that stressed 
civil rights, more independent living, rehabilitation, and 
contribution to normal society when individuals with 
disabilities were provided with accommodations. This 
changing outlook meant education was key toward treatment 
and development of independent living skills. 
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A Recognition of due process rights meant that society 
could never return to the exclusionary practices of 
education, housing, and employment of the past. It is clear 
that the combination of advocacy, organizational talent, 
federal litigation, and conspiring events within other 
minority movements such as the Black Civil Rights Movement 
helped propel a small cadre of talented college educated 
disabled people to positions within the power structure 
where they could lobby for additional meaningful 
legislation to produce legal due process and special 
education for the disabled. 
 Scholars and textbook authors who have written how 
Brown was the catalyst for the DRM have failed to recognize 
the importance of the accomplishments of the BCRM from 
1948-50 prior to Brown. Acknowledging these accomplishments 
means scholars may depict an alternative knowledge base of 
due process/equal protection from the simplistic class 
based depiction of the past. It remains to analyze and 
interpret this reconstructed knowledge to see how scholars 
can benefit from this new awakening. I will address this 
issue in chapter three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
Methodology 
 
 I have attempted to assemble primary and secondary 
sources that addressed the relationship of the BCRM prior 
to Brown to the DRM and its subsequent efforts to acquire 
due process legislation for the disabled, and what scholars 
can glean from that. I have attempted to review judicial 
and Congressional data, personal testimony, influential 
personalities of the era, and respected scholarly writing 
to expose that previous scholars have asked incorrect 
questions when comparing the BCRM and DRM movements and 
arrived at conclusions too simplistic and not very 
insightful. 
Critics may suspect my interpretation and analysis 
because I was limited by sample size, as many disabled 
people in the 1950’s and 1960’s remained out of public 
view. A question arose whether leaders of the DRM like Ed 
Roberts and Judy Heumann accurately represented the mood of 
the disabled population. Nevertheless, as I examined 
history, Eichelberger (1989, p. 246) shared that when 
selecting data “the selection process determines the 
likelihood that the sample of subjects who actually 
participated in the study was representative of the 
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accessible population and that the target population was of 
concern to the researcher or reader”. As an historian 
making an analysis of people and events, causality need not 
inhibit analysis and interpretation because causality can 
never be established. “The best that can be done is to 
establish a plausible connection between the presumed cause 
and effect” (Anderson, 1990, p. 118). In the final analysis 
I valued the judgment of C. H. Edson who said there was no 
single, definable method of historical inquiry. 
I have examined holdings from Supreme Court Cases and 
state courts prior to Brown that addressed equal protection 
rights for blacks from 1948-1950 in an attempt to discern 
judicial reasoning that resulted in the protection of those 
rights. Key to this investigation was the primary sources 
of the legal team of participants representing the 
plaintiffs, referred to as the Legal Defense Team of the 
NAACP. Secondary authors who are literary experts on the 
civil rights era (1954-1968) like Charles Carson, Taylor 
Branch, Charles Payne, Richard Kluger, and Juan Williams 
furnished a narrative commentary of actions and events that 
occurred during that time period. The video series “Eyes on 
the Prize” on the civil rights era by Blackside, Inc. was a 
valuable source of primary graphic imagery of the Civil 
Rights Era. 
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 Disabled individuals like Ed Roberts and Judy Heumann 
provided personal testimonials of how it is to be disabled, 
and how they developed into effective lobbyists. Their 
education and political activity allowed them access to the 
established governmental decision-making power structure. 
Authors Willie Bryan and James Charlton provided insight of 
how disabled people have been treated in the past and how 
they seek acceptance and desire independence in their 
societal treatment. Supreme Court and state court cases 
involving due process rights for the disabled from 1967-72 
formed a core of primary sources that demonstrated the 
progression of due process prior to passage of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
Another set of primary sources consisted of 
influential members of Congress and their Congressional 
aides who helped to design legislation for due process for 
the disabled and created the language of special education 
law. The pages of testimony presented to the Senate 
Subcommittee on the Handicapped, part of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the over 500 
pages of testimony presented by the House Committee on 
Education and Labor provided valuable primary sources of 
those who partook in eventually creating and passing 
legislation for the disabled.  Both famous and common 
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people presented testimony to both Senate and House 
subcommittees extolling the value of educational programs 
for the disabled that enhanced independence, practical 
living skills, and a more productive economic future. 
Secondary sources included scholars like Doris 
Fleischer, Frieda Zames, Jacqueline Switzer, Stephen Percy, 
and Laura Rothstein and scholars who were also disabled 
like James Charlton and Willie Bryan who enumerated and 
offered analyses of disabilities and disability litigation 
and legislation. The work of Richard Scotch, pre-eminent 
scholar in documenting the rights of the disabled was an 
invaluable secondary source, especially in documenting 
passage of the Vocational and Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
Connecting BCRM / DRM Litigation 
 In analyzing litigation the BCRM undertook prior to 
the 1954 Brown decision, principally the Gaines, Sipuel, 
McLaurin, and Sweatt cases, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
state could not deny privilege under equal protection to a 
group based solely on race. In the Gaines v. Missouri 
(1938) decision Chief Justice Hughes declared that denying 
state privileges based upon race was “a denial of the 
equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege” 
(p. 4). In succeeding cases, the Court consistently held 
that the issue of race could not be a factor determining 
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privilege. “The state must provide legal education for 
petitioner in conformity with the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment…” (Sweatt v. Painter, 1950, p. 
3). While it is undeniable that scholars (Irons, 2002; 
Gray, 2002; Tushnet, 1987) agreed that in these early cases 
race and minority group status was one of the benchmarks 
for which the Court determined the disenfranchisement of 
equal protection, it was not the only factor. 
 What scholars have failed to scrutinize in these early 
cases is that the Court set the precedent for recognizing 
the individuality of the petitioner in his/her denial of 
rights not his/her denial based solely upon minority and 
racial status. Chief Justice Hughes had stated in the 
Gaines decision, (1938) “It is the individual who is 
entitled to the equal protection of the laws…” (p. 4). This 
precedent continued through the Sipuel, (1948) McLaurin, 
(1950) and Sweatt (1950) cases. Chief Justice Vinson 
declared in Sweat v. Painter, (1950, p. 3) “It is 
fundamental that these cases concern rights which are 
personal and present”. The word “fundamental” was key, for 
it indicated the Court no longer conceived of equal 
protection privilege solely along racial and minority 
status, but also because of the intrinsic personal nature 
and value of the individual. 
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Importance in acceptance of individuality was a 
primary connection with subsequent due process cases for 
the disabled. This individuality was key to accepting the 
petitioner not as a group but as an independent person, a 
distinct personality with an individualized disability. 
 While scholars like Rothstein, (2000) Osbourne Jr., 
(1996) and Turnbull III, (1986) may wish to emphasize how 
national attention and increased parent advocacy 
intensified to designate the disabled as a recognized 
minority group during the 1960’s and early 1970’s, 
litigation during this time centered specifically on 
recognizing the rights of the individual through class 
action suits. Attorneys in the Wolf, Diana, Wyatt, PARC, 
and Mills, cases, which were highlighted in chapter two, 
argued that these disabled petitioners were individuals 
with personal specific disabilities. Their value as 
individuals required inclusion in the mainstream and 
accommodations within an Individual Education Plan (IEP) to 
succeed independently to their greatest capability. 
Scholars like Covey (1998) have argued how advocates 
of the disabled emulated the BCRM by using similar legal 
arguments of minority status. However, he has missed the 
notion of the importance of individuality in these initial 
DRM court cases, made possible by BCRM cases argued by the 
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Legal Defense Team previous to Brown. This is a critical 
omission because his reasoning assumed early DRM success at 
litigation was based on recognition of minority status, 
class-consciousness, and a common goal. In fact, courts 
never suggested minority recognition in these judicial 
cases. Due process rights of personal, individual children 
were paramount in these case holdings. These decisions 
ultimately paved the way for the creation of special 
education on an individualized basis rather than on a class 
basis. 
This misunderstanding can alter the impression of the 
theoretical philosophy and structural framework scholars 
and specialists who teach K-12 education may possess. These 
providers might lose sight of the personality and 
individual needs of the individual and mistakenly classify 
and categorize disabled students by disability type rather 
than by individual need. A grouping mentality is anathema 
to the theoretical way of thinking in special education. 
 Scholars like Hardeman et al. (2008) maintained the 
DRM was influenced by the BCRM during the Civil Rights Era 
1954-68. It is accurate DRM advocates emulated and copied 
some tactics employed by blacks for many of their local 
housing, transportation, and work accommodation concerns: 
marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, and boycotts. Some 
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scholars like Kirk et al. (2000) and Gearheart et al. 
(1996) assumed this emulation also helped to increase 
class-consciousness of the disabled and their evolution 
into a mass movement during this time period. However as 
Fleischer and Zames, (2001) Scotch, (2001) and Percy (1989) 
demonstrated in key literature, the DRM was a fractured, 
disunited group with questionable minority status during 
the Civil Rights Era. It required a generation (1948-73) 
before the DRM accepted itself as a unified movement, 
achieved minority status from Congress, and was thus able 
to achieve due process legislation with passage of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (NEA, 1978; Abeson et al., 
1975).  It is important that scholars denote this slowly 
evolving class-consciousness so they do not assume a 
seamless transition of educational inclusion occurred 
following Brown. However, it is not essential because 
minority status was not the benchmark determined by 
Congress when it established due process legislation for 
the disabled. Instead Congress considered individuality as 
evidenced by linking federal funding to anti-discrimination 
(Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 1973). 
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Differences in Two Movements 
What scholars need to note is that the civil rights 
litigation by the BCRM prior to Brown was the crucial time 
period in the relationship between the BCRM and the DRM, 
not the period following Brown. Prominent civil rights 
writers like Taylor Branch, Juan Williams, and “Eyes on the 
Prize” archival video footage have exaggerated scholarly 
emphasis of actions and events between 1954-68 in its 
influence in promoting civil rights for all minorities. 
What is more accurate when scholars investigate the 
leadership, membership, and organization of the two 
movements during the Civil Rights Era, is more their 
differences rather than their similarities. It is these 
differences that help one understand how the movements 
worked more distinct from each other than in concert 
together. Other than Thurgood Marshall, named a Supreme 
Court justice in 1967, Hubert Humphrey, a hero for black 
civil rights at the 1948 Democratic Convention, and Judge 
Frank Johnson, appellate judge for the Wyatt v. Hardin case 
and the judge who allowed James Meredith to enroll into Ole 
Miss in 1962, blacks or their supporters, according Francis 
and Silvers, (2000) were mostly tepid bystanders during the 
Civil Rights Era (Francis and Silver, 2000). 
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There may have been two reasons for this lack of 
support. First, limited resources in affording litigation. 
Second, lack of identification with class-consciousness 
with disabled individuals who differed in color, education, 
geographic location, and socio-economic status.  
An indicator of the importance of the relationship 
between the BCRM and the DRM prior to Brown rather than 
after Brown is to analyze leadership, membership, and 
organization of both movements. A review of major 
literature revealed stark differences in these categories 
between the movements. Leadership within the BCRM of 
talented lawyers, literate preachers trained at highly 
respected divinity schools, and national organizers trained 
by a top-down organization (NAACP) contrasted sharply with 
leadership characteristics of the DRM who were white, upper 
middle-class, college educated, urban, and by the 1970’s, 
connected to the existing white power structure (Scotch, 
2001). 
Juan Williams, (2004) Richard Kluger, (2004) Charles 
Payne, (1995) Taylor Branch, (1998) and Charles Carson 
(1981) highlighted how membership of the BCRM consisted of 
the entire black community whether urban or rural, rich or 
poor, educated or illiterate united together to fight a 
legally enforced Jim Crow power structure that ostracized 
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and excluded them from social and economic acceptance. 
Whereas disabled individuals, many would not even refer to 
themselves as a “membership”, (Scotch, 2001) lacked a 
unified collective consciousness because of their disparate 
disabilities. They mainly lived with family, separated from 
other disabled individuals, and ignorant of the size of 
their numbers. 
Their success at achieving due process rights 
according to Scotch, (2001) Bryan, (1996) and Turnbull III 
(1986) lay with lobbying top-down power brokers, 
Congressmen, Congressional aides familiar with the black 
civil rights legislation language, and from testimonials 
from notable and famous personalities who had stories to 
tell of disabled loved ones (U.S. Senate, Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 
1973; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education 
and Labor, Subcommittee on Select Education, Hearings on 
Education of the Handicapped Amendments, 1973). 
According to Carson, (1981) the BCRM utilized a 
bottom-up strategy of organization that took advantage of 
trained organizers in organizations like the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference, Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee, (SNCC) Congress of Racial Equality, 
(CORE) and the NAACP who energized a mainly rural and 
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poorly educated base. They emphasized that blacks could no 
longer accept the status quo power structure, humiliating 
and demeaning as it existed. The organization courted both 
national and local media to get this message across, 
represented most visually during the 1968 strike by garbage 
workers in Memphis, Tennessee, when workers paraded down 
Memphis streets wearing sandwich boards that read: I AM A 
MAN! (Williams, 1987; Eyes on the Prize, 1986). 
This contrasted with any concerted organizational 
strategy by the DRM during the Civil Rights Era. Key was 
historical research (Scotch, 1989, pp. 380-400) that showed 
the DRM was a loosely structured grassroots organization 
with few resources and achieved coordination on occasional 
events that brought activists forth. According to Scotch, 
(1989 p.389) the DRM “ did not control an institutional 
network”. There was no aggregate data on individual or 
organizational participation in the DRM. Instead their 
interests were advanced during the 1960’s and early 1970’s 
by top-down advocacy from parent lobbying groups and non-
disabled beneficent leaders of charitable and governmental 
organizations. 
The few individual leaders with disabilities like Ed 
Roberts and Judy Heumann who spoke for the disabled did not 
do so in a coordinated organizational fashion, but did so 
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randomly, to address personal local concerns of housing, 
transportation, and working conditions. Had those 
commanding the power and authorization adequately addressed 
these localized issues, one may doubt whether serious 
advocacy action may have occurred, or whether there would 
have been notable media attention. 
Therefore, rather than scholars emphasizing the 
coalescence of two movements during the Civil Rights Era 
and the so-called seamless nature of inclusion by blacks 
and the disabled, they need to stress the irony that the 
two movements moved in the same direction toward civil 
rights at all. As previously stated, a review of major 
court cases following the Brown decision revealed little to 
no interchange of expertise from leadership of the BCRM to 
advocates of the disabled. Members of the Legal Defense 
Team, with the exception of Thurgood Marshall, were 
noticeably absent, as were major BCRM organizational 
leaders. 
Thus scholars have examined inaccurate events and the 
wrong time period when exploring the relationship of the 
black and disabled movements. They have incorrectly 
surmised that one movement (BCRM) seamlessly ushered in due 
process rights for the other movement (DRM). They have 
explored the wrong question: How did one movement assist 
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the other during the Civil rights Era? The important 
question is how did the DRM value its relationship to the 
BCRM during the time period before Brown? 
Individuality As Linkage of Two Movements 
The answer may be that the Legal Defense Team 
litigated a number of equal protection cases that 
established precedence that first, individuals could not be 
denied equal protection privileges based solely on race. 
Second, what would prove most important as a legal 
justification for future advocates representing due process 
litigation (1967-72) for the DRM, Supreme Court justices 
became convinced that equal protection was personal and 
specific to an individual petitioner and not a legalistic 
abstract tenet only of race, minority status, or class-
consciousness. 
The idea of individuality gave a human face to what is 
meant by equal protection and due process. This was 
accomplished through the holdings in these crucial cases 
that preceded the Brown decision. Holdings in Gaines, 
Sipuel, McLaurin, and Sweatt emphasized the value of the 
individual and acceptance of individual differences. It 
gave a human face to a legal argument. Litigators in future 
DRM cases would assert the value of the individual, 
acceptance of individual differences, the petitioners 
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personal disability, and the realistic accommodations that 
were necessary to protect individuality and personal 
independence. This idea supersedes the more restrictive 
thinking generated in Brown that denying inclusive 
education on a K-12 level was based upon a collective 
racial or class-conscious paradigm. 
Independence 
 Whereas the concept of group and collective class-
consciousness may be associated with classification and 
categorization such as race, gender, religion, or national 
origin, the idea of individuality is rooted in the notion  
of uniqueness, independence, and personal characteristics. 
While the Brown decision legalized public education for a 
particular class of people, namely non-whites, prior Brown 
cases addressed a personal individual. It was this 
individuality that led litigants of the disabled to 
emphasize how education could create acceptance of their 
character, require society to provide accommodations, and 
therefore increase their independence to achieve practical 
living skills to the best of their functioning ability. 
Charlton (1998, p. 23-24)) noted that without economic 
independence, the disabled were characterized as “outcasts” 
and “surplus population”. Rather than being lumped into a 
class-conscious group, litigation for due process for the 
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disabled in the early 1970’s stressed the inherent respect 
and value of the individual, (Wolf, 1969; PARC, 1972; 
Mills, 1972) what Nagle referred to as the petitioner’s 
basic civil rights. Bryan (2002, p. 173) stressed the pre-
eminence of the individual over being labeled as a minority 
class when he stated, “Instead, those with disabilities 
were defined as unique with their disabilities overriding 
any other minority status as a class title…” As a result, 
Civil rights obtained, according to Bryan (2002), required 
accommodation from mainstream society. 
 Scholars have neglected to emphasize the importance 
independence meant for the disabled as they struggled to 
obtain due process legislation from 1954-73, instead 
focusing on minority status as Brown emphasized. This 
created unnecessary delay as scholars argued back and forth 
who was and who was not a minority group. Michael Hineberg, 
Independent Living Coordinator for Independence First in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, cautioned non-disabled people about 
helping the disabled in his article Seven Statements People 
With Disabilities Do Not Want To Hear to “use careful 
judgment when you offer help, because independence is a 
core issue to anyone with a disability” (Hineberg, 2010, 
p.7). He also intoned that the term “those” people connotes 
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separateness and what is different. “People with 
disabilities want to be treated as equals” (p. 7). 
Scholars need to cease emphasizing that attaining 
minority group status during the Civil Rights Era was 
important for disabled people. First, it never occurred 
since they were not legitimately recognized as such until 
1973. Second, they did not desire to be categorized into 
being another minority group. They were already separated 
from society.  
Federal Legislation of Due Process Rights for the Disabled 
 It has been established by several scholars (Hetzner, 
2011; Longmore, 2003; Bryan, 2002; Charlton, 1998) that in 
order to achieve greater economic potential, societal 
accommodations were needed that created opportunities for 
employment, independence, and the development of practical 
living skills. By the 1970’s, the disabled needed 
legislation to guarantee their civil rights, and improved 
accommodations so they could compete more fairly in normal 
society. While Congressional House and Senate hearings in 
1973-74 sought to extend the economic potential of the 
disabled, Scotch (2001) maintained that advocacy soon 
evolved toward basic civil rights. Thus Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 reflected nearly intact language 
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in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that protected minorities 
from discrimination. 
 The difference in constructing this civil rights 
language for the disabled from language that was developed 
for minorities in 1964 was that rights of an individual 
were emphasized over civil rights of a race or class. This 
individuality of the person’s right ultimately owes its 
creation to Supreme Court cases reviewed in the literature 
prior to Brown: Gaines, Sipuel, McLaurin, and Painter. 
However, one would search diligently to find this 
connection in scholarly writing, where importance easily 
shifts to the connection with Brown. Had this connection to 
Brown been accurate, one could question whether a twenty-
year delay of due process for the disabled would have 
occurred. It is more difficult to explain how, if this 
connection were indeed true, there was not a concomitant 
push for litigation and legislation for both movements 
during the same time period. 
 Due process for disabled children also lagged years 
behind the equal protection that had occurred for minority 
children during the Civil Rights Era. However, once Section 
504 guaranteed due process for disabled adults, efforts to 
extend rights to school age children for inclusion in 
public education became an extended outgrowth. Legislation 
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eventually passed in 1975, The Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (EHA or P. L. 94-142). It 
guaranteed a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in 
the least restrictive environment (LRE) in a program that 
met the individual needs of the child. Parents had the 
right to challenge assessment and placement in a special 
education program. The safeguards of Section 504 applied to 
children as well. 
Implications of Section 504 and P. L. 94-142 
 Analyzing the historical context of Section 504 
revealed that neither its creators nor its enforcers 
envisioned the millions of dollars in revenue that were 
needed to enforce it within the executive department of the 
federal government over the next thirty-five years. Section 
504, according to Scotch (2001) and Shrybman, (1982) had 
been added to the bill as an afterthought. The President, 
distracted with his own impeachment proceedings in 1973, 
had paid no attention to its ramifications, nor had he 
anticipated what a powerful lever for due process it would 
be for special education policy. At times, historical 
trends and events may be the result of serendipity. 
 When comparing legislation that established due 
process for the disabled to the court cases before Brown, 
the linkage to individuality, personal rights, the 
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intrinsic value of the person, and acceptance of the 
individual’s distinct disability and needs established two 
basic premises that have influenced creation and 
implementation of special education over the past thirty-
five years. First, acceptance of one’s disability and the 
right to have it and to compete in a more equal societal 
setting has rendered the argument of philosophical approach 
to treatment models between a medical model or an 
educational model moot. Causation of disability is no 
longer an issue. Debates in the 1940’s and 1950’s that 
argued whether society or the disabled individual needed to 
accommodate are no longer important. 
Education, independence, and approximating the 
individual to his highest level of independent living are 
paramount. This involves societal accommodation and the 
acceptance of civil rights for the individual. Scholars no 
longer depict the disabled as one class or one minority, 
but as a host of individuals, each with his or her 
individual needs. The class-conscious sweeping holding in 
Brown does not apply nor should it be the standard scholars 
depict when comparing the BCRM to the DRM. 
 Second, independence is emphasized over economic 
consideration. While economic factors like employment are 
an integral part of one’s independence, they do not 
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ultimately uphold the basic value itself of the individual 
and societal acceptance of the existence of a person’s 
disability and strength of character. Today organizations 
like L. I. F. E. Academy (Leisure, Inclusion, Fun, 
Experiences) in West Allis, Wisconsin plan for a smoother 
transition from high school to independent living by 
challenging the individual to work within the realm of his 
disability  (Hetzner, 2011, pp. 1-2).  
Acceptance of the basic rights of the individual over 
the economic potential the person can generate to benefit 
society is key. Education that increases practical 
independent living supersedes any individualized vocational 
training or dispensed paternalistic offerings that address 
solely economic behavior. In a comparison, due process 
rights supplant economic rights, and in treatment of the 
disabled, the economy should be a non-factor. 
 In conclusion, I maintain that individuality and the 
value of the person reflected the relationship between the 
BCRM and the DRM in the holdings in several cases that 
preceded the Brown decision, not race, class-consciousness, 
or minority status. Scholars have overemphasized the 
importance of Brown in this relationship, and they have 
overly relied on the collective class-consciousness and 
racial overtones of the case. They have incorrectly assumed 
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a seamless transition of due process rights for blacks and 
the disabled based on the holding in Brown. They have 
chosen a time period of the Civil Rights Era (1948-68) to 
explore the relationship between the BCRM and the DRM that 
did not compare because this era addressed the rights of a 
minority class as an aggregated group and missed the 
evolution of rights for the disabled as one of 
individuality, linked to the BCRM in a pre-Brown time 
period. 
Scholars need to revisit their interpretation of equal 
protection and due process for these two movements and be 
more accurate in noting similarities and differences. As 
scholars reinterpret the relationship between the two 
movements, they will develop an alternative understanding 
of the structural framework and theoretical interpretation 
of special education in K-12 education. Chapter four will 
provide some conclusions about this alternative thinking. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION 
Individualism Versus Minority Status 
 If scholars examine the relationship between the BCRM 
and the DRE, the critical time period was 1948-50. It was 
during that period the Legal Defense Team established the 
importance of individuality and the present and personal 
experience of equal protection of the litigant to the 
Supreme Court. While race was a factor in the court 
decisions of Gaines, Sipuel, Sweatt, and Painter, scholars 
have overlooked the deeper insightful thinking of the 
justices. They have overlooked the importance of 
individuality because of the landmark Brown decision of 
1954 outlawing denial of equal protection because of race 
and minority status. Scholars seized the idea that 
outlawing discrimination against blacks meant all 
minorities would benefit from the judicial ruling. 
 This did not prove to be the case as key literature 
demonstrated those with disabilities obtained few 
opportunities for inclusion over several succeeding years. 
Too much scholarly time was devoted toward trying to 
establish minority status when that factor never mattered. 
Advocacy groups for the disabled appealed to an alternative 
strategy other than minority status to influence 
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legislators and the courts. They resorted to emphasizing 
the importance of the individuality of the person. This 
importance enjoined society to accept the character of the 
individual disabled person by accepting the person’s 
distinct disability. Implicit in this acceptance was 
society’s responsibility to provide reasonable 
accommodations for the disabled individual to compete as 
equally as possible in those aspects of society deemed most 
necessary for the pursuit of happiness: education, housing, 
mobility, employment, and leisure. 
 Even though litigation was pressed in the form of 
class action suits to enjoin courts to hear the cases, 
advocates stressed individuality over minority status as a 
legal strategy, emphasizing personal goals over group 
goals. Litigation for the disabled from 1967-72 centered 
upon education. This education had to increase 
independence, practical living skills, and preparation for 
life in mainstream society. An individual education plan 
was paramount, and the idea of categorization, 
classification, class-consciousness, or group 
identification did not apply. 
Therefore, the Brown decision was not representative 
of the relationship between the BCRM and the DRM. The 
crucial relationship was the linkage with the prior Supreme 
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Court cases Gaines, Sipuel, Sweatt, and Painter. These 
cases provided the link of individuality that united the 
two movements. 
Recognizing Structural Framework of Special Education 
 If scholars recognize this linkage, and they 
acknowledge that the DRM identified 1948-50 as the 
important time period to emulate the tactics of the BCM, 
then they will comprehend how legislation to create special 
education developed. They will more clearly understand why 
special education in K-12 public schools is based on six 
principles elaborated by Turnbull III: (1986) 1) Individual 
and appropriate education, 2) Least restrictive 
environment, 3) Zero reject, 4) Testing, assessment and 
placement, 5) Procedural due process, and 6) Parent 
participation and shared decision making. Each of these 
principles was designed to protect the due process of an 
individual, not a group or class. 
Scholars should realize that due process of the 
disabled is inherently bound up with individual and 
personal rights, not the rights of a group or a minority. 
Thus all actions to increase academic, social, and 
emotional performance of the student must be individually 
based and never compared to a norm. 
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 Scholars who recognize the DRM copied the Legal 
Defense Team’s posturing of individuality in cases prior to 
Brown may view the structural framework of special 
education in that vein. Structural framework refers to the 
manner in which special education due process was 
established and how it is implemented in today’s schools. 
Individuality avoids educating students together as a group 
or category type. Each student is assessed, programmed for 
coursework, and evaluated based on his individual education 
plan. Performance success is measured by what skill 
development is needed to reach the next level of 
performance. The student is never compared to the 
performance of others. 
 Scholars in the past, when comparing the inclusion of 
blacks as a minority and disabled students, have erred in 
their perception of special education. Based on how they 
compared it to the inclusion promised in Brown for 
minorities, they have incorrectly classified special 
education as a secondary arm of regular education devoted 
to another type of minority. When in fact an analogy of 
special education depicts it as a mosaic of individuals and 
not a unified systemic complete picture. Each child in 
special education possesses a unique, specialized, 
individual education plan. Scholars have erred if they have 
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categorized special education as a monolithic systematized 
institution. 
Independence and Accommodation 
 If one views the structural framework of special 
education as a collection of individuals rather than as one 
systematized wing of the broader education system, one 
comprehends the essence of independence upon which it is 
built. The goal of special education is independence of the 
disabled individual. This involves increasing practical 
living skills and functional independence. For this to 
occur, the individual will need opportunities to compete in 
society where he or she can develop the skills needed to be 
independent. Scholars need to redevelop their perception of 
disabilities away from paternalism toward independence, 
because the burden then shifts responsibility for providing 
accommodations upon society. Scholars who have devoted 
research toward maintaining medical models of treatment for 
the disabled are not contributing to their independence. 
They may be promoting paternalistic dependence by failing 
to recognize a need to balance society’s competition. 
 Key literature indicated that most disabled 
individuals desire independence and want to achieve in an 
inclusive society. If scholars recognized individuality 
instead of categorizing the disabled as a group, they will 
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better understand that the goal of K-12 special education 
is to increase a disabled person’s ability to the greatest 
level of their performance. That means their education will 
be practical and relevant to their life needs. This will 
insure dynamic programming that meets the individual needs 
of the learner, rather than a rote set of courses. 
Conclusion 
 Finally, examining the relationship between two 
movements, the BCM and the DRE, has revealed that scholars 
erred when they assumed the Brown decision ushered in a new 
era of inclusion for the disabled. It did not occur because 
the premise upon which it was based, minority status, was 
faulty. Scholars wasted considerable research time arguing 
about minority status when it was not a factor. 
Individuality was the factor that eventually opened the 
door of due process in legislation for the disabled. This 
was made possible by tactics advocates of the disabled 
emulated from legal arguments promoted by the Legal Defense 
Team of the BCRM from 1948-50, when these attorneys 
convinced Supreme Court justices in four crucial cases that 
equal protection was a personal, individual matter with 
repercussions to the individual when rights were denied. It 
went beyond group or class-consciousness. 
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 Future research may have scholars stress the 
importance of individuality to implementation of special 
education when they author textbooks designed for an 
audience that will teach disabled students. Students in the 
field need to be cognizant of the individualistic nature of 
special education for a student-by-student approach so they 
do not categorize special education as an organizational 
institution administering to yet another minority group. 
Future studies will hopefully emphasize the humanness of 
special education over the organizational role. 
The Future of Special Education 
 Given the individuality of special education as it was 
designed educational professional will need to explore 
equal protection in the context of the regular education 
classroom the special education student will attend. As 
important as the individual needs are of the disabled 
students, so are the equal protection rights of regular 
students and the educational climate of the classroom. The 
school must provide a learning environment free of 
disruption and distraction. This may pose a challenge to 
the regular teacher and support special education personnel 
given the nature of intellectual, emotional, and learning 
disabilities displayed by disabled students. Guaranteeing 
due process rights of the disabled cannot be at the expense 
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of regular education students whose civil rights must also 
be protected. 
 Promoting a more inclusive setting that protects due 
process rights for the disabled while ensuring a calm 
learning environment for a majority of regular education 
students will continue to pose a challenge for educators. 
Special educators will need to coordinate their teaching 
with regular education colleagues to insure that the needs 
of all students are met. In addition, it will be important 
to sensitize both regular education students and their 
parents to the individual needs of their disabled 
classmates while not sacrificing the pedagogy of regular 
education students. Balancing rights for all students is an 
issue that needs more in depth research by scholars in 
future studies. Maintaining a quality learning environment 
that protects equal protection and due process rights for 
all students is a priority educators must fulfill. This 
will require more scrutiny in the future.      
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